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Abstract
Nonviolent mass movements are an important and increasingly ubiquitous
element of interstate politics in the 21st century. Diverse states - democratic,
autocratic, rich, and developing – all have supported movements in some form.
Explaining the convergence of such state actors on support for usually pro-democratic
mass resistance challenges our existing scholarly frameworks. Using a new dataset, I
reconcile the differing explanations of foreign assistance to movements that political
science would offer with deep descriptive analysis pursued inductively. First, I
propose a conceptual foundation for external support, couching an individual state’s
support as the manifestation of an outcome-oriented foreign policy and offering five
different categories of support types. To better compare amongst states supporters
globally, though, I offer a way to detect the nature of a state’s commitment to a
supported movement based on the costs it assumes when providing assistance. In a
heuristic case study, I examine the South African Anti-Apartheid movement and find
that the most committed states offered diverse forms of support and had engaged
domestic constituencies. I extrapolate from the broader South Africa findings to
conduct a global analysis of support to movements between 2000-2014, which yields
three ideal types of state supporters: willing revisionists, institutional stewards, and
grievance legitimizers. The data reveal new dynamics in international politics. Most
prominently, I show that in the face of a mass movement, countries most amenable to
ii

a disruption in the status quo tend to limit direct involvement, while offering loud
condemnations. Meanwhile, states most interested in the promotion of democracy
work with the afflicted government quietly behind the scenes.

iii

Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to the members of my committee. Without Erica Chenoweth’s
mentorship as a professor and faith in me as a data project manager this dissertation
simply would not have been possible. I am indebted to Tim Sisk, whose deep expertise I
drew on repeatedly and who pushed me across the finish line. I am grateful to Jack
Donnelly for his careful intellectual guidance and training over several years that has
made me a more thorough and inquisitive researcher. Finally, endless thanks go to Ryan
Bakker for his superior training in quantitative methods, which enabled me to tell a more
interesting story.
I am extremely fortunate to have been welcomed into the Korbel School community
of scholars. I am grateful to my classmates Paul Kemp, Scott Gallaway, Laura Hosman,
Chris Wiley Shay, Sooyeon Kang, Lucas de Oliveira Paes, Jillian Janflone, Dogus Aktan,
Jonathan Pinckney, Pauline Moore, and Kara Kingma Neu for their advice and
friendship. Thank you also to the attendees of the Korbel Research Seminar and the
Harvard Kennedy School’s Political Violence Workshop for their comments and
suggestions. Finally, I am grateful to the University of Michigan’s ICPSR quantitative
methods program, and the many professors there, particularly Adam Enders who
provided critical advice and guidance.
My family has supported me throughout the entire dissertation process. Thank you to
my parents Steve and Elaine for their unremitting encouragement throughout. I am
deeply grateful to my husband Dan for his selfless support and love along the entire
journey, and to our children Mila and Ozzie for their resilience along the way.
iv

Table of Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vii
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... viii
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
What has Stood in the Way? ........................................................................................................ 8
Preview of the Argument and Findings ..................................................................................... 12
Introducing the Data .................................................................................................................. 15
Study Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 17
Research Design & What’s Ahead............................................................................................. 20
Chapter 2: Finding its Place - External Support to Nonviolent Protest and Existing Frameworks in
IR and CP ....................................................................................................................................... 23
State Support to Nonviolent Movements: Frameworks and their Limits................................... 27
Weakness 1: Narrow state interests might be subordinated to wider concerns with system
stability. ................................................................................................................................. 27
Weakness 2: The principle of institutional homophily is not inviolable. .............................. 30
Weakness 3: International solidarity with human rights is sullied by disingenuous
performance. .......................................................................................................................... 33
Extracting State Commitment from the Foreign Policy Process................................................ 36
Chapter 3: Commitment and Convergence during the South African Anti-Apartheid Struggle ... 49
The Anti-Apartheid Struggle: Pre-War II Period ....................................................................... 53
Post-war Period (1948 – 1984) .................................................................................................. 55
Mass Action Phase (1984 – 1994) ............................................................................................. 61
Unrest and International Convergence ....................................................................................... 67
Geopolitical Easing ................................................................................................................ 70
Normative Entrenchment ....................................................................................................... 73
Clusters of Commitment ............................................................................................................ 76
Chapter 4: Zones of Commitment.................................................................................................. 86
Bayesian IRT Variable ............................................................................................................... 89
Mapping State Supporters .......................................................................................................... 98
Defining the Zones of Commitment ........................................................................................ 104
Zone 1: Willing Revisionism ............................................................................................... 106
Zone 2: Instrumentalist Grievance Legitimation ................................................................. 110
Zone 3: Institutional Stewardship ........................................................................................ 112
Outliers and Borderline Case ............................................................................................... 114
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications .................................................................................... 117
Implications for Scholars ......................................................................................................... 121
Implications for Policymakers ................................................................................................. 123
Implications for Activists/Practitioners.................................................................................... 124

v

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 125
Methodological Appendix: Maps versus Matrices ...................................................................... 139
Bayesian Item Response Theory .............................................................................................. 142
Multidimensional Scaling and Dimensional Analysis ............................................................. 150
K-means Clustering .................................................................................................................. 152

vi

List of Tables
Table 1 Categories of Support and Their Corresponding Supportive Activities ........................... 46
Table 2 Item Parameters (* indicates that the 95% posterior distribution included zero) ........... 145
Table 3 Most and Least Supported Movements in EX-D ............................................................ 147
Table 4 Most and Least Prolific State Supporters........................................................................ 148
Table 5 Two-parameter IRT Model with 1 Constraint ................................................................ 149
Table 6 Multidimensional Scaling Code...................................................................................... 152
Table 7 Cluster Selection Code.................................................................................................... 155

vii

List of Figures
Figure 1 International Presence in South Africa ............................................................................ 68
Figure 2 Key UN Action on South Africa ..................................................................................... 74
Figure 3 MDS Plot of Anti-Apartheid State Supporters (1986-1988) ........................................... 80
Figure 4 South Africa MDS Variables........................................................................................... 83
Figure 5 IRT Variable Indicator Frequencies ................................................................................ 90
Figure 6 Item Characteristic Curves .............................................................................................. 91
Figure 7 Summary of IRT Variable Interpretation ........................................................................ 93
Figure 8 Foreign Involvement Scores of all States in the Syrian Uprising .................................... 95
Figure 9 USA Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014) ...................... 96
Figure 10 Sweden Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014) ............... 97
Figure 11 China Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014) .................. 98
Figure 12 Descriptive Statistics for MDS Auxiliary Variables ................................................... 100
Figure 13 MDS Solution for Global Sample ............................................................................... 101
Figure 14 Variables that Define Dimensional Interpretation ....................................................... 102
Figure 15 Variables that Do Not Define Dimensional Interpretation .......................................... 103
Figure 16 Ideal Type Characteristics ........................................................................................... 106
Figure 17 Shapes of Commitment ............................................................................................... 107
Figure 18 US Observations Dominate the Dynamic Portion of Zone 1 ...................................... 110
Figure 19 Cluster Selection Plot .................................................................................................. 154

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction

Protest movements, when sufficiently encompassing, threaten the survival of the
regime they target. The early 21st Century has been in part defined by two events of
protest movement contagion that have come with surprise and sudden downfalls of sitting
governments. The Color Revolutions brought down governments in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan. During the Arab Spring, governments in Tunisia and Egypt fell. These
regionally concentrated events have given way to more geographically dispersed episodes
of mass protest in 2019-2020 that took place in Lebanon, Iraq, Belarus, Hong Kong, and
included the ousting of Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir after over 30 years in power.
Protests arise upon the convergence of three necessary conditions: group
motivation, mobilization structure(s), and a perceived political opportunity (Davenport
2005, xv). Put differently, they utilize a propitious moment and some resource base to
issue a shared claim to the sitting government. This action comprises a direct domestic
challenge to the government’s political authority. Because of the potency of the rebuke,
mass movements usually encounter repression at the hands of the regime (Davenport
2005) that transgresses international human rights norms. The repression will likely
include some form of physical violence, censorship, blocking of communication
technologies, or civil society restrictions.
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If governments would be right to fear protests, the International Relations
literature rather depicts their core concern centering upon foreign support to those
protests. The repression that so regularly goes with mass protest can bring stark and
unhelpful international attention to the government’s behavior. This attention sometimes
brings adverse consequences like sanctions that interfere with the regime’s ability to put
down dissent with any measure they choose. For some regimes, the specter of foreign
involvement is existential. Protests are seen by autocratic governments as the gateway to
forced democratization (Selth 2008; Wright 2017; Cooley and Nexon 2020). Thus, the
uncertain power of a protest made more potent with foreign backing is perceived as a
dangerous mix for a government seeking to repress. In seems plausible that a 21st century
repressive state might not fear protests as much as it fears the tying of its hands in
containing the protest the way it sees fit.
The 2007 Saffron Revolution in Burma exemplifies a familiar chain of events and
highlights an important disconnect in the scholarly literature on foreign support to
movements. In August, protests in Burma contested the sudden cutting of fuel and gas
subsidies by the military government. Despite immediate arrests and beatings of
protesters, including by regime sponsored militias, demonstrations continued. On
September 5th in Pakokku, army officers fired weapons toward and beat monks that were
also protesting the price hikes. This attack against a revered group of individuals spurred
widespread outrage that breathed new life into the broader anti-government campaign.
After demands from the All Burma Monks Alliance for an apology, reduction in fuel
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prices, and release of political prisoners were ignored, the ABMA called for renewed
protests on September 17th.
At first, authorities appeared permissive of these demonstrations and even
allowed a group of monks to see and pray with Aung San Suu Kyi who was under house
arrest at the time (Human Rights Watch 2007). Protests on September 24 in Rangoon
were estimated at 150,000 people, including monks and civilians. However, the period of
perceived laxity turned into a harsh and expedited crackdown in Rangoon beginning on
September 26 that involved beatings, open firing on protesters, driving of vehicles
through crowds, and at least 3,000 detentions and 31 deaths (Selth 2008; Human Rights
Watch 2007).
The awe of international onlookers witnessing the mass resistance gave way to a
shared horror that generated intensified international action. Before the September 26
crackdown, foreign support was mainly limited to US, UK, and EU statements in
multilateral settings against repression. In the aftermath the September 26, though, the
coalition broadened. Selth (2008) describes optimism surrounding a presidential
statement issued by the UN Security Council calling for restraint and dialogue, supported
by Russia and China. A rebuke by ASEAN, and China’s willingness to support a UN
Human Rights Council resolution condemning the violence provided further
encouragement. Tangible measures against the regime included travel and financial
sanctions by the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and the EU. Japan cancelled millions in aid.
This impressive diversity of states willing to take a public stance aligns with Keck and
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Sikkink’s (1998) finding that the application of bodily harm to vulnerable populations is
an issue area that particularly energizes international actors.1
Selth also predicted, though, that the international community was too easily
wooed by Burma’s subsequent offers of reform.
Despite the announcement of a constitutional referendum, leading to a general election,
there is no sign that the regime accepts the validity of the international community’s
concerns or has been persuaded to change its approach. It shows no inclination to seek a
substantive dialogue with the opposition movement, nor does it seem likely to respond
any differently should Burma’s people once again take to the streets.

He appears to have been right. A constitutional referendum in 2008 promised elections,
but the military was reserved enough seats to prevent undesirable constitutional change.
The 2010 parliamentary elections were rejected as fraudulent by Western government
and boycotted by the opposition. In the 2015 elections, opposition leader Aung San Suu
Kyi won and assumed power, but subsequent ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims
shows the persistence of the regime’s brutality. And now, the deposal of Aung San Suu
Kyi by military forces in 2021 has brought Burma back almost full circle to 2007.
According to Selth, during the Saffron Revolution, international state support was quick
to materialize, but also quick to dissipate, leaving behind only the veneer of real reform.
This idea of superficial international support sits awkwardly, though, with the
emphasis by Selth and others (Wright 2017) that autocratic regimes deeply fear the role
that external support could have in bringing about unwanted democratization. On one
hand, Selth writes that aid to civil society in Burma, including to protests, is perceived by

1

The legal equality of opportunity is the other issue area around which transnational campaigns rally
effectively.
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the regime as “part of a multi-layered campaign to subvert…the government” and
ultimately bring about regime change (Selth 2008, 293). Indeed, it is part of the “soft
war” being waged by Western democracies (Wright 2017). On the other hand, scholars
that study social movements agree that external assistance might enable the movement
along narrow lines but cannot account for movement outcomes (McFaul 2007; Johansen
2011; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021). Zunes and Ibrahim (2009) go further saying “no
foreign government or NGO can recruit or mobilize the large numbers of ordinary
civilians necessary to build a movement capable of effectively challenging the
established political leadership, much less of toppling a government.” What is striking
then, is how the literature conveys foreign support to protests as both a source of great
perceived threat, and as ineffective and uncoordinated gestures that do not bring about
real change.
We might be tempted to attribute the disconnect to different disciplinary
emphases in IR and CP and carry on. But, repressive regimes are not suffering their fear
of foreign involvement in silence. They claim often that protests are the result of
sovereignty-violating foreign interference as a way to distract from the legitimacy of the
people’s grievances. According to a new dataset featured in this dissertation, the Burmese
regime, along with 40% of regimes targeted with maximalist nonviolent resistance, claim
protesters are puppets of foreign powers or being incited and equipped by them. In one
example, the government in Zimbabwe accused the US embassy of “mobilizing and
funding disturbances, coordinating violence, and training insurgency” (AP, 28 July
2020). Unrest in Venezuela, Belarus, and Hong Kong has all been derided as foreign
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plots. Whether the claims convey sincere concern or not, they risk delegitimizing the
movements agitating for civil rights.2 Usually, the regime claims foreign powers are
fueling domestic insurrection to either destabilize the country or oust a sitting
government. They are traitors, in other words, that would sacrifice the good of the
country for individual political ends (Johansen 2009). Movement participants, in turn,
fear and take efforts to avoid the irrevocable “foreign agents” label, which can jeopardize
their popular appeal.
The fear of foreign involvement goes beyond sharp words. The intensity of the
perceived threat has at least in part motivated global efforts by Russia and China to
delegitimize Western democracy and offer up principles for an alternative global order
(Cooley and Nexon 2020). At the level of practice, authoritarian governments, striving to
prevent unwanted democratization, together are learning ways of restricting the
development of civil society (Hall and Ambrosio 2017). Most striking is the degree to
which nondemocracies have succeeded at closing domestic civil space (Carothers and
Brechenmacher 2014). They are restricting the receipt of foreign funds by civil society
groups, forcing foreign NGOs to submit to intrusive registration processes, and
cultivating a subverted civil society friendly to the government (Depuy, Ron, and Prakash
2016; Christensen and Weinstein 2013; Robertson 2011; Cooley and Nexon 2020).3

2

Graeme Robertson (2011, 190) writes that physical coercion against protesters will be more likely when
demonstrators can be depicted as foreign agents.
3

Hall and Ambrosio (2017) note the Arab Spring instigated a period of authoritarian learning, remarkable
for its velocity– Saudi Arabia’s reforms in the wake of the successful revolution in Tunisia, are case in
point.
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Russia is a prominent example, but Belarus, China, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea have also
taken measures (Johansen 2009, 199).
Work that bridges the chasm between IR’s notion of the fearful government and
the comparativist’s notion of meandering foreign supporters can push back against, or at
least help contextualize, the narrative of malingering foreign governments put forward by
targeted regimes. To this end, this dissertation shows that for states, the political or prodemocratic goals of the movement, however noble, are usually merely a secondary
consideration in the tooling and execution of foreign policy. This is to say that protesters’
demands are genuine and not the machinations of Western powers. What preoccupies
most foreign supporters is the balancing act between bilateral relations, strategic interests,
international system implications, and of course, the national moral compass. Given the
unprecedented ubiquity of mass protests today (Chenoweth et al. 2019), the importance
of this form of international politics will only grow. External support to protests is not an
issue only for Western democracies, but rather an international practice seizing attention
from all states. 4 Thus, alongside the onset and broadening of transnational activism
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005), we have also seen the emergence of varying
forms and patterns of state support to nonviolent resistance abroad.
How, then, do states respond to foreign maximalist uprisings? Despite the
growing importance of the topic, the field of political science has not yet studied it from a
global systematic perspective. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, we lack

4

According to Ottaway and Carothers (2012), the end of the Cold War "dramatically reduced the
assumption that any politically oriented aid was driven by underlying security concerns."
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understanding of the approaches foreign governments take toward mass resistance despite
it becoming a more prominent element of international social life than ever before. In
particular, no work has yet characterized state support to maximalist campaigns in ways
that depict the true diversity in actors and the variation in their behaviors. Related
literatures in military intervention, development aid, and support to insurgency, while
useful as a baseline, tend to characterize external support narrowly (usually in blunt
financial or military terms) and in contexts incompatible with that of the primarily
nonviolent mass campaign.
This dissertation aims to fill the void. I use a case study and new global dataset to
provide descriptive and heuristic insight into the relationships foreign governments
assume toward mass nonviolent resistance. Using a global set of 95 actors supporting 65
different mass movements, this research engages in quantitative theory building,
approaching the topic from a view of outcome-oriented foreign policy making,
appropriately contextualized. While drawing on the literatures of military intervention,
democracy promotion, international norms, and external support to rebellion, I make the
case that external support to movements merits focused attention so that we may properly
set foundations.

What has Stood in the Way?
Within political science, the study of social movements has fallen within the
broader purview of contentious politics and democratization. Quantitative study of
nonviolent resistance and its political ramifications is relatively new. It emerged with a
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path breaking study that showed nonviolent resistance surpasses its violent counterpart in
efficacy and explained why this is the case (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This initial
pooling of nonviolent and violent resistance made sense given the discipline’s anchoring
interest in conflict.
Although interest in nonviolent contention is growing, our emphasis on physical
coercion has deep roots. Seminal work in the field argued that understanding war better
may lead us to help prevent its onset (Waltz 1959), a noble sentiment that has guided the
discipline for decades. The aim of ending physical violence surely drives the focus on
armed conflict that includes work on terrorism (Byman 2005), great power war (Levy
2015), mass violence (Valentino 2004), and insurgency (Weinstein 2007), among others.
5

Studies that related nonviolent contention to violent rebellion and revolution have

succeeded in bringing nonviolent resistance forward in the research agenda.
However, there are good reasons to put aside this pooled approach to look at
nonviolent resistance on its own. Ackerman and Merriman (2019) make a compelling
case that the use of nonviolence has lifesaving potential, too, and research thus far bears
this out (Perkoski and Chenoweth 2018). Then, violent and nonviolent resistance are very

5

Concern with physical violence encompasses the political science literature overall. This characteristic has
the byproduct of missing important behaviors in a global system undergoing measurable change. War is
becoming rarer (Goldstein 2012) with less mortality (Gat 2012). Even more broadly, systemic changes are
afoot in the modern state system dragging regimes toward the norms of democracy even if such norms are
routinely resisted (Bermeo 2016; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre 1999). More to the point for this project,
though, contention is becoming nonviolent in nature and state support to nonstate actors appears to be
following suit. Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham (2011, 713) noted the shift from interstate war to external
support to rebels following WWII. This support to rebels reflected well the ubiquity of civil war and
rebellion that characterized the Cold War era. Since then, the collapse of the Cold War has seen an upsurge
in nonviolent contention (Tarrow 2011; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, n.d.)
providing states new opportunities to intervene in others’ affairs via less costly and more internationally
legitimate ways.
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different. To be sure, the mass movement is a subset of contentious politics that is
transgressive and non-institutional like violent contention (Chenoweth and Cunningham
2013). These events create uncertainty, new political alignments, and a “residue of
change” shaping future generations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 9). But that is
essentially where similarities with violent resistance ends. This dissertation hopes to, at
least for now, push aside remnants of research on violent resistance that cloud efforts to
achieve sharp understanding of nonviolent resistance. There are three incompatibilities
that justify taking up external support to nonviolence explicitly.
First, unlike support to insurgency or violent rebellion, external support to
nonviolent resistance is not necessarily adversarial toward a targeted government.
Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not. A key finding elaborated in later chapters is that
very rarely do foreign governments materially support nonviolent resistance to the
exclusion of also enabling civil society through official channels. In contrast, work on
external support to insurgency, some of which incorporates nonviolent resistance,
emphasizes the adversarial nature of the supporter and targeted regime, casting foreign
supporters as either clearly pro-regime or pro-movement (San-Akca 2016; J. Jackson
2019).
The second incompatibility is the degree to which the outcomes of violent and
nonviolent resistance depend on external assistance. The success of violent resistance
groups like insurgents hinges on external support that usually furnishes arms and physical
sanctuary (Record 2006; Salehyan 2007; Byman et al. 2001). On the other hand, as
alluded to above, external support to nonviolent resistance movements is a more delicate
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matter. This support tends to be less material in nature (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011),
and can be unwelcome by the movement.6 Dissident campaigns, rightfully wary of being
branded as traitors or foreign puppets, dispute public claims of foreign affiliation in the
media, and in some cases try to conceal or minimize the receipt of material support from
abroad when they do receive it. A movement’s success depends not on arms or sanctuary,
but on sympathy from the population, domestic elites, and the military (Blair 2013, 8990; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Put simply, claims of foreign infiltration jeopardize
the movement’s wide appeal – a significant positive outcome for the regime.
Finally, the theoretical foundations often used to understand violent resistance do
not work well when examining the nonviolent variety. The external support to insurgency
literature, in particular, often relies on a principal-agent framework (Byman and Kreps
2010), which does not appropriately capture the dynamics inherent to state-movement
relationships.7 Whereas the political controversy behind armed movements will naturally
limit the number of “principals” or supporters it might attract, potential supporters to a
nonviolent movement can be numerous, muddying the allegiance a movement can
provide to a single sponsor. In other words, mass movements would make quite
inefficient agents. Not to mention, protest movements can arise and disperse suddenly,

6

As an example, see discussion of the controversy surrounding accepting international support among
members of the South African United Democratic Front in Seekings (2000, 119).
7

The usefulness of an armed group as a state agent can coexist with nonviolent resistance. For example,
during the anti apartheid struggle, we would be hard pressed to call the UDF the “agent” of any particular
state. However, an analyst of the period did refer to the South African regime using the militant Inkatha
Freedom Party as an offsetting force to the ANC (Marx 1992, 3072).
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allowing less opportunity for strategic relationship building between principal and agent
as can be the case between states and armed rebellion, which can last many years.
Theory building around support to nonviolent movements should be based on a
clean slate. Prominent explanations of state support to violent resistance cannot be
translated to the nonviolent context because they conflict with core realities featured in
this dissertation. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) find that potential state
supporters of insurgency consider the capabilities of the prospect rebel group and
preference alignment when deciding to offer support. I find reason, though, to believe
that more capable protest would be less inclined to want or accept international support,
and that states likely view the goals and political orientation of the protests as secondary,
if at all (see the US-Venezuela vignette in Chapter 4). Ideational ties between state
sponsor and rebel group emerges as a key explanatory variable for state support in SanAkca (2016). This variable, however, only makes more sense when analyzing support to
nonstate actors coming from one or two state sponsors – not the international coalitions
that sometimes emerge in support of nonviolent resistance. Finally, Daniel Byman’s work
portrays state support of terrorism as a tool of weak states. The global study below will
show that, in contrast, support to protest movements is usually undertaken by states with
more capabilities than the targeted government.

Preview of the Argument and Findings
This dissertation places concept development and measurement forefront. Given
our state of knowledge on external support to movements, and the difficulty in measuring
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aspects of nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013), I also adopt a
heuristic approach to initial exploration into empirical patterns. I couch government
support to foreign mass resistance as the result of a state acting on an individual policy
objective. State supporters act to enable a certain outcome vis a vis the campaign that is
compatible with that objective. Framing support as an outcome deriving from a selected
policy objective places the debate in more concrete terms than the broader frameworks
that usually guide our research such as interests, institutions, or ideas. In my framing,
broad policy objectives (i.e., regime change, constructive engagement, or democracy
promotion) drive states’ decisions to select certain forms of support that might include:
legitimating a movement, equipping it to persist, pressuring the regime to reform or
negotiate, stabilizing the unrest with protective measures, or enabling civil society
through official development aid channels (ODA).
Yet, because of the international legitimacy of using nonviolent resistance to
achieve political rights, it is difficult to meaningfully compare state orientations toward
movements based on observed behavior alone. Rather, a single foreign policy, like
support to campaigns, could further multiple policy objectives that range from the
instrumental to the idealistic. States can reap benefits from supporting pro-democracy
protests that they cannot reap from arming an insurgency. The ambiguity of foreign
support in the protest movement context has poignancy because of the wide acceptance
of democratic norms in the extant international order. The dominant frameworks in
political science do not provide a clear answer as to whether we should expect states to
support movements primarily based on material interests, to generate international
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stability, to promote certain institutions, or in defense of human rights. Rather, finding
the answer typically falls to the individual researcher to choose a preferred epistemology,
and work within those bounds. Thus, this dissertation, takes an inductive approach to
state support, considering context and relational variables suggested by the literature as
possible drivers. Following the approach put forward by Jackson and Nexon (2013), this
supports a fundamental goal of “identifying recurrent patterns of interaction” that might
be “independent of their cultural and temporal [but not social] context.”
This dissertation’s theory building case study on South Africa helps to set
foundations by showing us the importance of the specter of instability and amenable
geopolitical conditions for spurring states to support movements. Additionally, from
foreign involvement in the Anti-Apartheid movement, we learn the importance of several
variables that account for variation in states’ commitment to campaigns: its bilateral
relationship with the targeted government, economic ties, domestic support for the
movement, and its embeddedness in the global human rights regime.
The global study redeems the usefulness of the five support types I propose in
Chapter 2 and demonstrates that states do not support movements in a simple low to high
sort of variation in intensity. Rather, less involved supporters provide narrow support of a
single type, while more involved (and committed) states offer diversified repertoires that
include both active measures and diplomatic moves. I contextualize state involvement in
underlying conditions to find three “zones of commitment,” each of which encompasses
an ideal typical state supporter: a willing revisionist, an institutional steward, and an
instrumental grievance legitimizer.
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These three ideal types of state supporters vary in demonstrable ways according to
underlying organizing principles. Prominent among these are the nature of the support
provided, the foreign policy alignment of supporting and targeted state, and the degree to
which the supporter is embedded in the global human rights regime. From this map we
learn counterintuitively that those who would benefit most from a revision of the status
quo are least likely to directly support a movement. Meanwhile, the most dedicated
democracy promoters tend to work quietly behind the scenes. We also gain a new
understanding for the degree to which the United States stands alone in its willingness to
actively support movements in states with which it has a troubled bilateral relationship.
Overall, the case study and the global analysis show how rare it is for states to jeopardize
their own interests to act on behalf of a movement, and that the actual interests of the
movement are rather marginal to state action.

Introducing the Data
This research benefits from the new global dataset External Support for
Nonviolent Campaigns (EX-D) that captures instances of support (material and
performative) provided to maximalist campaigns between the years 2000-2014. A
maximalist campaign8 is a bottom-up groundswell of deep opposition to a sitting
government, that occurs in a series of “observable, continuous, and purposive mass
tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). It

8

In this dissertation maximalist campaign, protest movement, and social movement are used
interchangeably.
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becomes maximalist as a function of its objectives: overthrowing the existing regime,
expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination (Chenoweth and Lewis
2013). EX-D captures protest movements globally from the period of interest, which
include the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring. The South African Anti-Apartheid
campaign is the one exception, whose peak years span 1984-1994. In this dissertation, the
South Africa data is analyzed separately from the core sample.
EX-D is an extension of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
(NAVCO) dataset 2.1 and draws its subject campaigns from it (Chenoweth and Shay
2017). Contrary to NAVCO’s inclusion of both nonviolent and violent campaigns, EX-D
documents incidents of support only to campaigns considered primarily nonviolent. My
sample of 95 state supporters provided assistance to 65 unique movements, which jointly
received a total of 6,005 instances of support during the active campaign years. Of note,
EX-D documents instances of foreign support provided to movements from governments,
international government organizations (IGO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO),
individuals, and others. This project focuses on the support provided by states, but I do
use EX-D to create a variable indicating whether state support for a moment co-occurred
with domestic nongovernment support.
During data collection, graduate student coders identified instances of support
through two different data collection methods. First, they used standardized search terms
to pull media records from LexisNexis, and they manually located academic publications,
policy papers, and websites, as necessary. A second team of coders directed their efforts
toward the AidData.org database. Using a uniform filter, coders reviewed tens of
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thousands of instances of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) made available
by AidData.org. Where information was available, we coded this support as financial
assistance to the lowest possible level of recipient, such as a particular local organization.
When no recipient was indicated, we coded the support as going to the host (i.e.,
targeted) government.
Many of the AidData.org observations in EX-D consist of financial support
provided to an eligible government in support of civil society and human rights.
According to the OECD, countries eligible to receive ODA are low- and middle-income
countries, based on gross national income, as reported by the United Nations and the
World Bank (OECD DAC n.d.). These observations mostly include funds provided to
some government agency with the aim of enhancing political participation, providing
election monitoring support, and cultivating respect of human rights. Although it might
be counterintuitive to consider support to a government as support to a movement, we
note that movements are reliant on an informed and engaged citizenry. Thus, in the
dataset, we code ODA to a sitting government during peak campaign years as “enabling”
the movement, given its applicability to mass mobilization potential.9

Study Limitations

9

Coders also identified support provided during a 5-year pre-campaign phase, and a 5-year post-campaign
phase (see also Johansen 2011). For all phases, coders included only support that related to civil society,
with one exception. In the post-phase of a campaign that took control of the targeted government (i.e., the
Awami League in Bangladesh in 2009), any form of support to the newly seated government was coded.
Support for newly seated governments, we argue, comprise a vote of confidence and an indication of
support for the new governments’ success.
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This study has limitations given the nature of observational data. First, the data
only include overt instances of external support. Some authors make mention of covert
government involvement in protest movements (Zunes 2013; Johansen 2009) and such
instances are not included in my data unless they were otherwise publicly reported by the
time of data collection. Actually, it makes sense to focus on overt support that is publicly
reported since this is most likely to influence public opinion regarding the campaign and
influence foreign government behavior.
Second, the study is susceptible to some degree of bias in that I have data only on
external support to movements and civil society that was likely accepted. Movements
may have many reasons to not want to accept external support. The lack of foreign
government support may reflect the wishes of the movement, seeking to avoid
characterizations of foreign puppetry, rather than an absence of a willing supporter
(Johansen 2009). Zunes and Ibrahim (2009, 96) describe how the Obama administration
allocated support to Iranian dissident groups, but they were too fearful to accept it
(although some also declined as a matter of principle). Denial or avoidance of U.S.
government assistance also occurred during the South Africa Anti-Apartheid struggle
(Lyman 2002, 41). Or, in some cases repression may be so strong as to make acceptance
impossible. As Encarnacion (2011) writes, civil society may be merely another tool of the
regime. Put simply, foreign state support to a movement could reflect more about the
current political environment than the foreign policy of the supporting state or the merits
of the movement’s cause.
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Third, a dataset that relies in part on media reports, as EX-D does, also carries
caveats. On a general level, media reports suffer from selection bias and veracity
concerns (Earl et al. 2004). Empirical analysis has shown that while useful at high levels
of aggregation, media reports are more problematic for subnational, fine-grained analyses
(Weidmann 2016), which is not conducted here. EX-D attenuates risk posed by coded
media reports by consulting several different types of source material. Coders reviewed
humanitarian reports, academic work, and ODA project descriptions alongside media
reporting by international news wires. Also, EX-D relies on the “good” kind of media
reported information: the who, what, where and when, rather than interpretations of local
events. Thus, bias does not present a major concern although missing data could be an
issue (Earl et al. 2004).
Fourth, I have limited the scope of the study in several ways. This study does not
look at third-party support provided to the regime, even though we know this happens
and is important (Chyzh and Labzina 2018; Zunes 2013). An additional interesting and
important topic, rivaling third-party support (where one state supports a movement and
its adversary props up the regime), is relatively rare and not considered here although it is
elsewhere (J. A. Jackson, San-Akca, and Maoz 2020). In my sample of 779 supporterprotest dyads, rivaling support took place only 84 times. Finally, maximalist campaigns
are themselves rare events compared with the whole universe of social movements that
may be recipients of support. The claims offered by this dissertation apply only to
support to maximalist movements, and not nonviolent resistance generally.
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Research Design & What’s Ahead
The research design applied in this dissertation has an eye toward setting

conceptual foundations and empirical bearings regarding support to nonviolent resistance.
It is quantitative, but inductive and descriptive, having an orientation that differs from
middle-level causal explanations typically more prized within the field of political
science (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013). I undertake this project to, in Jackson and
Nexon’s language, map “basic substances and processes that constitute world politics,”
knowing that the stronger the underlying foundation, the better subsequent explanation is
likely to be. Descriptive and heuristic work has made important marks on our knowledge
(P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013; Esping-Andersen 1990; Dahl 1971), and I hope to add to
it.
In the next chapter, I outline the basis for undertaking inductive descriptive work.
I wrestle with the current state of the literature relevant to external support, which
demonstrates three weaknesses that prevent a clear telling of the external support story.
First, we might think foreign support takes place to further the supporter’s narrow selfinterests – but this view shrouds cases where states have prioritized system stability over
individual gain. External support also could be a democracy promotion story – but this
view cannot easily account for the cases when autocracies support democracy abroad,
and when democratic governments decline to do so. Finally, external support might be a
sign of international solidarity with a global regime of human rights, but this could be
questioned by work indicating that some government engage in performative signaling to
reap material gains or distract from their own abuses.
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To mediate amongst these weaknesses and uncover a more concrete launching
point to study foreign support for nonviolent resistance, Chapter 3 offers a heuristic case
study. I examine the South African Anti-Apartheid struggle with focus on the years 19841994. This case is the foremost example of a successful maximalist movement and boasts
an unmatched supportive international coalition. The case study ventures an explanation
of the timeframe and conditions underlying international convergence around the cause to
end apartheid. Specifically, it shows that geopolitical conditions, entrenched international
normative discourse, and the specter of deep instability were necessary to unite diverse
persuasions of national governments around the same objective. These conditions inform
the global study in the subsequent chapter.
In Chapter 4 I use a combination of quantitative techniques to map three zones of
state commitment to protest movements. The analysis leverages three different methods.
First, I use Bayesian Item Response Theory to create a single variable that captures the
quality of observed support provided by each state based on five proposed support types.
Then, I contextualize this variable by including it in a 2-D multidimensional scaling
solution. I analyze the raw solution to first interpret the meaning of each axis. Then, to
extract and interpret ideal types, I overlay the MDS map with k-means clusters. The
clusters outline three zones of ideal typical state supporters, differentiable according to
the quality of commitment they have toward the corresponding movement. At the center
of each cluster (or “zone”) are state-protest dyads most characteristic of that ideal type. I
provide one vignette of each ideal type, point to an interesting outlier, and show a
borderline case. A final section summarizes the dissertation’s key findings, and explains
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implications for scholars, policymakers, and activists. I include at the end of the
dissertation a methodological appendix that discusses in more detail my reasoning for
generating ideal types versus a typology of state supporters. It also explains the
quantitative methods in more detail and provides some addition output, tables, and R
code.
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Chapter 2: Finding its Place - External Support to Nonviolent Protest and
Existing Frameworks in IR and CP

This dissertation asks what sorts of supportive postures do states assume toward
protest movements and what brings them about? Despite the importance of mass
movements in international politics and their ubiquity in recent years theory and empirics
on state support for them remains sparse, crowded out by the field’s traditional emphasis
on the study of war and other forms of physical violence. The sparseness in existing
literature has left the phenomenon of external support weakly situated within
international relations theory and of only tangential interest in comparative politics. We
lack a concrete conceptual foundation and guiding analytic frameworks – gaps this
chapter hopes to fill. More importantly for my purposes, the theoretical orientation and
conceptual foundation developed here will affect model specification decisions in later
chapters.
One challenge of analyzing external support to movements is its ready
accessibility to all states. Some support, like equipping movements and enabling a robust
civil society, entails potentially large financial considerations. But other support, like
offering public expressions of solidarity, requires hardly any material resources at all.
Consider also that a single movement can see support from a diverse range of states: rich,
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poor, democratic, authoritarian, and rival or friend to the targeted government. It is this
diversity of supporters acting in concert that presents challenges for our existing
frameworks. The story of external support cannot clearly be just one of democracy
promotion, international norms, or sheer geopolitics. It must have space for all the above.
A strategy for addressing the ambiguity of state support to movements is needed
at the outset. Two governments, both supporting a movement with acts of solidarity, may
have a similar outward posture. Postures – conscious outward behavioral attitudes10 consists of observable behaviors amenable to being classified in a structured way. But,
the view of these two governments’ approach to the movement changes if we learn that
one has a serious rivalry with the targeted regime and the other a warm peace (Goertz,
Diehl, and Balas 2016). The support provided by the rival might be intuitive, but the
support provided to the movement by the ally becomes more difficult to grasp. Aydin
(2012, 35) writes that even with respect to military interventions, state motivations are
inherently ambiguous based on observed behavior alone. At most, states that take the
same actions can be assumed to have similar preferences as to the outcome:11
…[states intervening as part of a coalition] are at best brought together by the precarious similarity
in their preferences, and their motivations are hardly obvious from the specific actions they
undertake in the war environment. In these coalitions, complex goals might be at work. Strategic
incentives related to reputational issues such as fulfilling commitments to an organization or to a
major power ally may affect coalition partners’ decisions. Some interventions are simply
symbolic, such as smaller power joining NATO efforts…States without any political and
economic interest in the war country may be pulled into these coalitions or organizational
endeavors to please international and domestic audiences.

10

Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/posture?src=search-dict-hed, accessed April 8, 2021.
11

Alexander Wendt (1999, 232) would take issue with this statement thought, writing that states act based
not only on what they want, but what they think is possible to achieve.
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Thus, analytically, it is useful to look beyond aligned behaviors and outcome preferences
and begin to unearth driving conditions of support. Without such context, we are unable
to answer: Is the support a demonstration of a government defending human rights
internationally, or is it a manipulation of the normative environment aimed at papering
over one’s own abuses (see China’s criticism of the U.S. during Black Lives Matter
protests)? Is support to a protest movement an attempt to oust a sitting government or is it
more akin to offering that government bitter medicine that neutral or friendly countries
think it needs for stability and development?
At minimum, states supporting dissent in a rival should be differentiated
somehow from a friendly state offering true advocacy for the respect of human rights.
State supporters also vary in other consequential ways such as the supporters’
vulnerability to retaliation by the targeted government, the depth of their economic ties,
the strength of its domestic diaspora communities, or other domestic pressure to get
involved. Security concerns, economics, and domestic politics all might drive a state’s
decision to support movements. Donnelly (2013) writes, “human rights are but one of
many interests pursued in foreign policy,” but I would add that many interests can be
furthered by supporting human rights.
The framework proposed here situates support in a defined analytic context. I
account for the idea that on one hand tangible support is an output of a particular state’s
foreign policy, and on the other, we ultimately need a global comparative view, most
interestingly achieved if provided from the movement’s perspective. Thus, I propose
differentiating state support according to the varying qualities of a state’s commitment to
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the movement. If detected successfully, a state’s commitment to a movement can help us
compare state supporters on a global level. And, it accommodates a foreign policy lens by
defining commitment as the degree of self-servitude involved in a state’s support – in
other words, we need to ask, at what cost to the supporter is the assistance provided? I
find this framework to provide an alternative, more specific way to characterize the basis
of state behavior than high-level concepts that most often guide research in political
science like interests, institutions, or ideas.
This chapter aims to achieve two things. First, I make explicit the weaknesses in
existing orientations that make deductive analysis of external support to nonviolent
movements challenging. I organized the literature according to these three weaknesses
that demonstrate the regularity with which we see contradictory empirical findings that
preclude sharp theoretical expectations of external support. The lack of a clear foundation
justifies my inductive approach to my research question and to the EX-D dataset.
Second, in support of that inductive work, which follows in subsequent chapters, I
outline a conceptual framework. I propose that state postures toward movements vary
according to the observable forms of support provided to a protest movement. A state’s
posture reflects its underlying policy objective – for example, a state that pressures the
government, equips the movement, and is active diplomatically demonstrates an interest
in a revision of the status quo. At a minimum we should expect that states provide
support to movements in ways that they believe enable concrete outcomes on the ground
that are compatible with higher policy objectives. But, only by contextualizing the
observed behavior we can draw meaningful comparisons across state actors. A state’s
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commitment to a movement can be understood as such “contextualized involvement” that
enables meaningful global comparisons.

State Support to Nonviolent Movements: Frameworks and their Limits
Scholars generally rely on three general themes to make sense of why states do
what they do: interests, institutions, and ideas. I discuss below how none on their own can
convincingly characterize state support to nonviolent movements. They are approaches
that operate at an abstract level, reflecting a state’s strategic desiderata, perhaps, but they
cannot directly be applied to extract ideal types of state supporters.12 In other words,
even when we know something about a state’s interests, ideas, and institutions we do not,
necessarily know much about how particular states are likely to behave toward a
particular maximalist movement targeting a particular regime. Rather than three schools
of thought, the literature presents us with three unintegrated theoretical orientations, each
of which may apply, but we lack the foundations to determine how and when.

Weakness 1: Narrow state interests might be subordinated to wider concerns with system
stability.
Nation-states are at once self-interested units and vested members of an
international community. These two roles are not necessarily in contradiction – agreed
upon parameters of membership in the state system allows members efficiencies in

12

Morse (1970) drew an interesting distinction between transcendental foreign objectives and empirical
ones.
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pursuing their interests (Hurrell 2007, 39). Indeed, the empirical record shows states
coming to support violent and nonviolent contention wearing both hats. On one hand, we
could expect states to get involved in other’s unrest in ways that further its narrow
geopolitical interests and opportunistically jibe at rival governments. On the other hand,
we see reason to expect restraint. As Ikenberry (2001) writes, most states observe their
obligations and powerful states restrain their power.
Support for a movement, seen through the lens of narrow bilateral interest,
becomes an act against the targeted government much in the spirit of foreign support to
insurgency. In their study of state support to rebellion since the end of the Cold War,
Byman et al. (2001, 23) found geopolitical and strategic motives to be drivers of external
support, and more likely to be responsible than affinity-based motives like ideological,
ethnic, or religious ties.13 One goal, of several, is to destabilize neighbors. The proxy
warfare literature echoes the suspicion that external support is a political gambit against
the regime: fighting with another state via indirect means is a low-cost/low-risk
opportunity to achieve a foreign policy objective (Swami 2004; c.f. Salehyan 2010). If
support to nonviolent uprising is analogous in any way to support of violent rebellion - it
could be simply a way for a state to notch some gain against an existing rival. Prodemocracy protests, which have been linked to periods of economic crisis (Brancati
2016), should then present opportunity for rivalrous antagonism.

13

In later work, Byman (2005) argues that governments that choose to support armed nonstate actors might
be weak relative to their rival.
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The utility of the narrow self-interest frame, however, is restrained by work that
brings out states’ disinclination toward widespread destabilization. Pearson (1974) finds
that states are unlikely to attack or mount a hostile intervention against a state
beleaguered by violent uprising. Rather, he found such contexts associated with
intervention friendly toward the government. Uzonyi and Rider (2017) show that regimethreatening instability rallies states to give foreign aid to an afflicted government, even in
the presence of bilateral rivalry.14
The threat of mass instability is almost certainly on states’ minds when addressing
maximalist nonviolent campaigns. Maximalist campaigns are destabilizing to the afflicted
country and to its neighbors (Gleditsch and Rivera 2017). They are powerful enough to
end the reign of a sitting government and are relatively effective at doing so (Chenoweth
and Stephan 2011; Shaykhutdinov 2010). And, in the South Africa case study (chapter 3),
I show how the onset of unprecedented unrest corresponded with sudden and decisive
international support to bring contending parties to the table for negotiations. These
efforts were then followed by many years of international engagement that ultimately
brought about the nation’s first democratic election. The powers instilled in the UN
security council and the relatively new architecture of Responsibility to Protect codifies
the multilateral means for states to defend the existing system, forcibly if necessary.
Not only are states able to put aside narrow self interest in the security realm, but
also in the economic one. Enhancing national prosperity is a central foreign policy

14

Historical examples of the use of (militarized) intervention to instill stability in foreign lands exist, as
well (see discussion in Jentleson and Levite 1992, 13).
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objective (Morse 1970; Powell 1993) and should form a central consideration for states
settling on policy objectives and postures toward protest movements. Economic interests
have assumed even greater importance in the post war period (Joseph 2008). Intuitively,
states with less economic entanglements should be emboldened to act against a regime,
and states with economic ties would appear more likely to sit out.15
But the empirical record from South Africa during the Anti-Apartheid struggle
shows some states setting aside economic interest for the broader good, while others only
made pretenses to do so. Sweden for example, supported and upheld sanctions despite the
costs to its own industry, whereas China undermined them (N. C. Crawford 1999b;
Taylor 2000; Sellström 2002). Klotz (1995, 130) highlights newly independent
Zimbabwe’s role in the Anti-Apartheid movement whose support was at cross purposes
with that state’s short-term material interests. Zimbabwe’s support reflected its objective
to establish a regional system of states that shared its values: no minority rule, anticapitalistic economic orientations, and a commitment to Pan-Africanism.16 Whether in
terms of strategic or material gain, states vary in the degree to which they subordinate
their foreign policy to sheer interests.

Weakness 2: The principle of institutional homophily is not inviolable.

15

Waltz would disagree, of course, finding economic entanglements more likely to lead to conflict.

16

FRELIMO in Mozambique supported Zimbabwean independence despite economic reliance on the
Rhodesian settler government(Ohlson, Stedman, and Davies 1994, 54-56). Kenneth Kaunda’s principled
stand to abide by U.N.-imposed sanctions against Rhodesia cost Zambia’s economy $744 million between
1969 and 1977 (Stedman 56). It was domestic pressure that led Kaunda to reopen trade with Rhodesia in
contrast to wishes of other Frontline State allies (Tanzania’s Nyerere and Mozambique’s Machel)
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Perhaps the story of foreign support to mass movements is more akin to one of
institutional affinity. This foundational assumption finds prominence in both international
relations and comparative politics. Risse and Babayan (2015) sum up the general
expectation: “Western democracy promoters are likely to empower liberal groups in the
target countries, while countervailing efforts by non-democratic regional powers will
empower illiberal groups.” Owen (2002) writes that countries involved in imposing
certain domestic institutions abroad tend to promote institutions similar to their own. The
affinity is logical enough, but empirical evidence shows regime-type homophily is not an
iron-clad rule. Even though a generalized preference may exist, foreign policymaking
shows important variations according to bilateral relationships. In this respect, the
countervailing evidence is two-fold.
First, the literature suggests reasons why nondemocracies might have interest in
supporting democracy abroad, which could include supporting protests. Even though the
frame of a global struggle between autocracy and democracy remains prominent
(Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016, 5) and has been amplified in the work on
democratic backsliding (Waldner and Lust 2018) and autocratization (Lührmann and
Lindberg 2019),17 some work shows that autocracies benefit from relations with and
proximity to democracies. Democracies may be better alliance partners given their higher
likelihood of honoring commitments (for an overview of this debate see Gartzke and
Gleditsch 2004). They are more politically stable (Jensen 2008). And, living amongst

17

Saudi Arabia’s efforts to forestall democratic reforms in Bahrain would comport better with the literature
on autocratization (Roberts 2016, 294).
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democracies makes one less vulnerable to experiencing conflict (Skrede Gleditsch and
Ruggeri 2010; Enterline 1998). Not to mention, the presence of autocracy promotion
(analogous to democracy promotion) remains very much in question (Hall and Ambrosio
2017).
Too, instances of autocratic support for pro-democracy movements are many and
not something the framing of institutional affinity easily manages. China’s support to the
ANC, and the PAC conforms with explanations based on both ideological affinity and an
interest in international prestige (Williams and Hurst 2018; Taylor 2000). Russia’s
encouragement of reform and negotiations during the Syrian Uprising in 2011 can be
chalked up to concerns with stability of that country. And Iranian support to Egyptian
protesters is consistent with antagonization of a rival. Still, autocratic governments in
these cases support movements seeking rights that would not be respected within the
supporter’s territory. If the literature on authoritarian learning and autocratization is taken
at face value, we should not see autocratic support for protests at all. We should assume
that autocracies fear the feeding of precedent for domestic challenges, even though
research challenges the degree to which this assumption is warranted (Saideman 1997).
Second, autocracies are not the only ones that violate the institutional homophily
framing. On one hand, democracies have been known to shore up autocratic regimes
when it suits their interests. Brownlee (2012) points to U.S. support for autocracy in
Egypt. Ash (2011, 385-386) describes US support for martial law in the Philippines. On
the other hand, existing work finds that democracy promotion is not necessarily always
about promoting the most desirable and just form of government. Youngs (2009) offers a
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skeptical account of the European Union’s use of democracy promotion, which he sees as
being used to bring geopolitically beneficial stability to countries like Belarus, Ukraine,
and the Mediterranean and to secure certain resource access (i.e. gas contracts).18
The institutional homophily argument is limited by important characteristics of
politically salient dyadic relationships. Salience could emerge from many different
sources: resource dependence, geostrategic location, or transnational ties of kinship.
Burnell (2008) writes that “instruments and approaches employed in promoting
democracy are necessarily constitutive of the political relationship that the external actors
have with countries and with different political constituencies within those countries”
(421). San Acka (2016) writes with respect to support for rebel groups that state support
is endogenous to interstate relations. These arguments highlight that bilateral
relationships arise sui generis, which limits the degree to which we can expect
institutional homophily to characterize external support to nonviolent protest.
Weakness 3: International solidarity with human rights is sullied by disingenuous
performance.
External support to maximalist protest movements occurs in an international
context in which the free market is prized and human rights are codified (Buzan 2004).
Despite pluralism in modes of government, certain tenants of the liberal democratic order

See also the European Union Directorate-General for External Policies policy paper that claims: “support
for nonviolent action for human rights and democracy offers the EU an additional tool to use to establish
the long-term conditions for peace and stability” (Dudouet and Clark 2009, 20).
18
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hold universal legitimacy (Lake 2010; Deudney 2007).19 Given this context, we might be
tempted to trivialize foreign support to nonviolent movements. In this framing, states
provide support to movements to buoy collectives of people agitating for principles and
norms that have already been widely agreed to in international fora. In particular, external
support in contexts where the targeted state uses violent repression is consistent with
today’s normative context focused on civilian protection (Bellamy and Williams 2011).
This is especially plausible given evidence that international norms have great causal
force of their own (Tannenwald 2007) and in fact, shape state interests (Finnemore 1996).
Thus, support for movements might be explained simply as states acting in expected
ways given today’s international normative architecture.
The power and reach of international human rights norms, however, must be
qualified by research that shows the degree to which individual states subvert and exploit
them. For instance, existing work shows that selectively complying with or making
pretenses to care about norms allows states to avoid negative consequences. Dixon
(2017) highlights Bashir al Assad’s efforts to engage in norm avoidance by framing “its
violence as a type to which international norms against killing civilians did not apply.” 20
Indeed, we know that norms-violating regimes sign UN protocols with no intention to

Deudney writes “The second most important fact about the contemporary human situation is the liberaldemocratic ascent, the rise to an historically unprecedented preeminence of the ‘free world’ composed of
the United States and its democratic allies.” Lake (2009) points to the primacy of the existing order by
referring to acts of “symbolic obeisance,” including for example, puzzling contribution of troops to US
military operations actions.
20
Dixon defines norm avoidance as: “arguing that a state’s motivation or actions, or the outcome of its
actions, fall outside the parameters of a given norm, and that the norm has, therefore, not been violated”
(86). A similar dynamic is conveyed in Panke and Petersohn (2012).
19
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honor them. Simply giving the appearance of abiding by international norms is seen to
“relieve pressure” from international actors responding to abuses (Hafner-Burton 2012).
Promoting a sense of compliance attracts dividends, as well. States might voice
support for international norms in order to cheaply accrue reputation in the international
community given the absence of centralized enforcement of international conventions
(Panke and Petersohn 2012; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Or, as Ikenberry and Kupchan
(1990) write, elites experiencing domestic legitimacy crises may embrace “normative”
shifts as a strategy to reconsolidate their rule. Lastly, a state performing democratic
credentials to an international audience might be one relatively dependent on aid,
attempting to capture their “democratic premium” (Hyde 2011). In other words, we have
reason to question the sincerity with which states act in the name of norms. Linz (2000,
173) makes this point explicitly, writing that democratic claims of authoritarians should
not be taken at face value since these sorts of “commitments largely condition the
international response to such regimes and influence their later development, opening
certain possibilities and excluding others.” International norms, while prominent forces in
the global system, can yet be subverted, exploited, and avoided.
The presentation of the Three Weaknesses illustrates the obstacles to crafting a
clear story of external support to protest movements if we are vested in a single
framework, or way of seeing the world. The primary guiding frameworks of interests,
institutions, and ideas are ultimately limited in their applicability by compelling and
important qualifications. Thus, the literature offers a limited guiding theoretical
foundation for understanding foreign government support to movements, and the
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weaknesses in the scholarly record hinder persuasive hypothesizing about its underlying
conditions. For this reason, addressing my research question requires an inductive
approach built upon a focused conceptual foundation that takes support to nonviolent
protests seriously: as important in its own right, and not because of its corollaries to
conflict research. In the next section, I define that guiding conceptual orientation, which
forms the basis for inductive work in the chapters that follow.

Extracting State Commitment from the Foreign Policy Process
This section aims to reduce vagueness surrounding foreign government support to
protests, thereby establishing foundations necessary for data analysis.21 To do this I
propose a tailored conceptual foundation for foreign support that both enables the
organization of the information available in EX-D and provides purchase against the
stated research question. Key to this framework is the idea that states in today’s system
have a finite set of practices they can employ in support of protests (Pouliot 2016) so they
may look outwardly similar. It is the conditions underlying those practices that matters
for a global comparison amongst state actors – conditions that are both “situational and
dispositional” (Goddard 2018).
The crux of meaningful difference between supporting states is the degree of cost
they are willing to bear for the sake of the movement – in a word: commitment. States

Giovanni Sartori discussed both conceptual ambiguity and vagueness – ambiguity refers to a weak
connection between a concept’s meaning and the term selected for it, whereas concept vagueness suggests
difficulty in recognizing empirical cases of the concept (Collier and Gerring 2009). This section mostly
deals with conceptual vagueness by trying to assign labels to observed behavior in ways that facilitate
quantitative analysis.
21
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may engage in the same acts of support, but the conditions they come with and the
relational content between supporting and targeted state matters for determining whether
support to the movement is earnest assistance in favor of its success or a mere “moral-add
on” (Donnelly 2013). In our field, centered upon physical violence, the term resolve is
perhaps more familiar (Kertzer 2016), but commitment remains elusive. Framing support
to protests as a function of commitment appropriately conveys support in terms relevant
to the protest movement and as a concept that can varies more in character than
magnitude.22
Measuring commitment as an analytic goal is compatible with a view of the state
as a corporate actor. Even though the state comprises a complicated bureaucracy that
experiences internal disagreement, the movement mostly sees a unified actor, such as
“the United States,” or “Sweden.” States, particularly when executing foreign policy, are
thinly rational actors - that is, they are purposeful (Bengtsson and Hertting 2013). Thus,
even though their repertoire of support might be limited by accepted practices in the
domain of diplomacy (Pouliot 2008; 2016), the purposes and intent fueling their behavior
range more vastly. Finally, within the state bureaucracy, although key individuals may
lead the connection between movement and state (Mazur 2001), decisions are made in

Bellin (2000) writes: “commitment [in her case of labor and capital to democracy] is always refracted
through the prism of interest and can be predicted only on the basis of a clear understanding of this interest
and the variables that shape it” (184).
22
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groups (Maoz 1990) where officials together discern strategies, policy objectives, and
action plans.23
Broad bilateral policy objectives usually precede the emergence of a campaign or
movement and the state’s response to it. An example of a broad policy objective is the
oft-debated regime change policy for example, held by certain western states toward
states engaging in human rights abuses or nuclear proliferation like North Korea, Syria,
and Iran (Haas 2005, Foreign Policy). The now infamous policy of “constructive
engagement” held by the United States government toward apartheid South Africa (prior
to the mass movement phase of the 1980s) offers an additional example. Beyond this,
states may have governing policies that prioritize the defense of human rights,
maintaining the status quo, nonintervention, or appeasement. If a clear policy objective
exists, it serves as a grounding orientation shaping a state’s response to the onset of mass
nonviolent resistance.
Where does a protest movement fit within a state’s policy agenda? When
confronted with an international event such as a maximalist campaign, each supporting
state chooses actions that enable a certain movement outcome compatible with its
broader policy or policies. Aydin (2012, 72-74) outlines a similar account of the
policymaking process in the context of a military intervention – she describes an
intervener’s cost calculus amongst various policy options as they relate to belligerents in
the target country. Ultimate decisions to intervene end up enabling certain outcomes
23

Swedberg (2018, 189) summarizes the assumptions that Weber imputed to the ideal typical individual,
which are more detailed, but not necessarily in conflict with the assumptions above. For Weber, the typical
actor acts in a rational manner; has full knowledge of the situation, is fully aware of what he/she is doing;
and makes no mistakes.
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compatible with the intervener’s interests – such as driving parties to a negotiating table
or preventing escalation. Similarly, in the context of support to protest movement, the
public statement made to a gaggle of reporters is not the culmination of a policy
objective, but rather enabling an outcome with respect to a movement that makes
(possibly small) strides toward its achievement.
The idea that from a foreign policy point of view, observed and recorded state
action first and foremost enables outcomes compatible with a state’s overall policy
objective is demonstrated usefully by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester
Crocker in a statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1985. In it, he
addresses criticism of the Reagan administration’s policy toward South Africa amidst
racial discrimination and violent repression of mass action. It is worth reciting at length:

At this time of protests and other expressions of moral indignation-about apartheid and the killings
of blacks in South Africa-we should be able to agree on two things. We are fully justified in
expressing our moral indignation. At the same time, moral indignation by itself is not foreign
policy. If we are to play a positive, constructive role, it will not do to proclaim simply that we
must “do something” about apartheid and then select among proposals according to how good
they make us feel. Of course, there is a role for protest politics in any free society, and we respect
it. But I do not believe the American people vote for their elected leaders in Congress and the
executive branch to shape our foreign policies without regard to the practical results of those
policies. Hence, the onus is on all of us to consider carefully the consequences of current and
alternative policies. We cannot throw our hands in the air and say, in effect, “We are not interested
in the results in South Africa.”

In this example, the United States’ early response to mass resistance in South Africa
reflected its policy objective of “constructive engagement.” The U.S. in turn responded to
the movement in ways that it thought would enable gradual reforms – not the
fundamental change to universal franchise sought by activists and the African National
Congress (ANC). Seeing foreign policy as inherently outcome orientated puts external
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support in concrete terms rather than theoretical hunches that interests, institutions, or
ideas are driving the behavior. Additionally, we can bracket state motive, that is, the force
that shapes interests and gives rise to certain policy objectives. 24 With this background
we can make better sense of the activities observed and start to categorize them in
deliberate and analytically useful ways.
The set of supportive practices states engage in ranges from sending money to
offering training, implementing sanctions, and marching in solidarity with protesters. EXD codes state support as one of 10 possible categories, including all the above and more. I
propose grouping such observed support in ways that reasonably correspond to
movement outcomes a state would seek to enable through foreign policy channels. This
scheme, which benefits from global observations of what states actually do is more
comprehensive than other categorization schemes offered in the literature thus far. The
most common way to categorize supportive practices puts them in terms of their
orientation toward the targeted government. Support in this fashion is either positive (i.e.,
offering carrots, or encouraging reform) or punitive (applying sticks). Klotz (1995) writes
that the positive/punitive categorization was how Margaret Thatcher saw the foreign
policy options available to her in responding to the Anti-Apartheid struggle in the 1980s.
Donnelly (2013) offers a similarly spirited distinction of diplomacy or sanctions with
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Motives might be understood as a driving force with an emotional nature (i.e., fear, diffidence, greed,
moral obligation) that orients a state toward adopting particular interests. Interests help a state shape its
foreign policy objectives. These objectives then culminate in observable behaviors, practices, and
decisions. This association of motivation with an emotional quality is not a generally accepted definition. It
does seem consistent with discussions of state motivation found in (Donnelly 2000; Hurd 1999, 381).

40

regard to supporting human rights internationally – there is a persuasive option, and a
coercive one.
Other frameworks classify support from the vantage point of the movement.
Jackson (2019) considered support to be either direct (the offering of funds, mediation, or
other material support), or indirect (naming and shaming, media outreach and training).
Landsberg (2012) distinguishes between physical and enabling support, echoing the sense
of degree of contact with the movement. And, Sellström’s interview with Gora Ebrahim,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Pan-African Congress, conveys that activists at
the time saw support in terms of whether it applied pressure on the South African regime,
or supported the movement in continuing its struggle (Sellström 2002).
I expand on the previously proposed classification schemes, offering categories
that encompass the full range of supportive practices. This framework integrates the
foreign policy considerations of states with their actual effects on the ground. Starting
with the 10 raw categories coded in EX-D, I collapse them into five analytical categories
of support to movements. Some categories affect the movement directly, some target
regime behavior, and some affect the context.25 The categories are as follows – foreign
governments might: bolster the movement, equip activists, enable civil society, pressure
the regime, and stabilize the environment. Each are discussed in turn.

I would have liked to have specified a sixth category of “shepherding” the targeted government, which
would have separated the “stabilize” category into behaviors directed at the government and behavior
directed at the campaign milieu. This coding scheme resulted in two very sparse categories, which
jeopardizes statistical analysis.
25
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Bolstering a campaign includes making public statements of support, offering
physical displays of solidarity, or awarding honors to participants. The Canadian
parliament’s decision to award Aung San Suu Kyi honorary citizenship in 2008 following
the most heated phase of the Saffron Revolution exemplifies this support type.26 Such
forms of support communicate to the movement that its cause is legitimate, and they
communicate to the targeted government that the domestic challenge has merit. Tilly,
Tarrow, and McAdam (2001, 158) refer to something similar called certification, which
results in the “validation of actors, their performances, and their claims by external
authorities.” Bolstering performs a signaling function with respect to the movement.
States that bolster cross the line between the silent observer and those states taking a
public stance, however slight.
Governments also equip activists through the provisions of material assistance:
they might provide equipment, facilities, and training, for example, or the funds to
procure such things. States offering material assistance demonstrate a more active interest
in the movement’s endurance and success. Equipping activists is the most direct form of
support a state can provide, and therefore, the most likely to draw ire from the targeted
regime. Western support to activists of the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer Revolution
exemplifies the fraught nature of equipping activists directly. During that campaign,
British diplomats funneled communications equipment to activists via diplomatic pouch;
Norway and Hungary sent funds and equipment to activists in diplomatic vehicles

Sadly, this citizenship honor was revoked in 2018 because of Aung San Suu Kyi’s lack of action with
respect to military atrocities against the Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Neuman 2018).
26
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coming from Budapest (Jennings 2009). This investment in a movement’s success is
compatible with a state tolerant of disruption to the status quo in the movement state.
Then, states offer support with the intention of altering the behavior of the
targeted government. In this vein, states might apply pressure. This form of support
comprises sanctions, public condemnations, and calls to third party organizations like the
United Nations to act or engage in investigations. In EX-D, we use the broad definition of
sanctions not restricted to the economic variety. Crawford (1999b, 5) defines sanctions in
this sense, writing that sanctions are a “denial of customary interactions (strategic,
economic, or social).” During the Saffron Revolution, the United States took such action,
imposing visa restrictions on officials and financial sanctions in response to the violent
crackdown on protesters (Marciel 2007). The pressuring of a targeted regime
communicates a sense of urgency on the part of the supporter – usually provided with the
aim of halting human rights abuses. A state applying pressure, therefore, may not have
particular interest in the movement’s achievement of its political goals, but rather an
interest in creating space for the exercise of political rights, generally.
State support to protest movements could also favor reform, but be rooted in an
inherently pro-status quo orientation, aiming to work with rather than against the targeted
government. In this vein, a state might offer enabling support, which comprises the
provision of official development assistance (ODA). This form of support is provided
through official channels often to government organizations in the targeted state. During
the Syrian Uprising, for example, the United Kingdom had five different ODA
commitments to the Syrian government, all provided with the purpose of cultivating
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democratic participation and civil society. We consider it as support to the movement
because it is directed toward the cultivation of civil society, a resource without which
mass resistance campaigns could not take place.27 In EX-D, enabling support originates
primarily from OECD countries that have sent money to the targeted state in support of
the defense of human rights, election training, and cultivation of political participation.
Finally, states engage in supportive behaviors that stabilize the unrest. Stabilizing
behaviors might include facilitating negotiations, recognizing the regime for positive
reform, monitoring elections, sheltering the politically persecuted, and reporting on
human rights abuses.28 In 2011, the Iraqi government engaged in such support by trying
to persuade the Syrian government to allow an Arab League observer mission in the wake
of violence against protesters (AFP 2011). A multilateral example of what stabilizing
might look like can be found in the United Nations’ Commission on the Racial Situation
in the Union of South Africa, which executed a fact-finding mission that lasted three
years. The commission held a unique view of South Africa at the time. They advocated a
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Carothers and Ottaway open their book by discussing how bilateral civil society aid was scarcely heard
about in early 1990s, but by 2000 was a common feature. The authors point out that civil society support
(rather than political group support) has been argued to be a way of supporting democracy without
becoming too political “otherwise interfering unduly in the domestic politics of another country” (11). See
also their definition of a civil society group as one that seeks interaction with the state to advocate citizen
interests and oppose nondemocratic behavior while not competing for political office (11).
28
Expressing support for reforming regimes has a direct role in stabilizing conditions on the ground. U.S.
Ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman describes this, specifically “Repeatedly during this period
[the early 1990s], there was criticism of the reward and recognition that went to de Klerk, whether in the
award of the Liberty Medal in Philadelphia, discussed below, or of the Nobel Prize. These were important
steps, however. At a deeper level there had to be recognition of the tremendous pressures under which de
Klerk was operating, the dangers from his right wing and, potentially, from the security forces. Our policies
would have been foolhardy and self-defeating had we advocated measures that would have undermined de
Klerk’s authority or political capacity to complete the negotiations” (79).
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“fraternal” approach to South Africa in that it wanted to provide assistance through a
difficult period, rather than further isolate the regime (Stultz 1991).
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Table 1 Categories of Support and Their Corresponding Supportive Activities

Enable
Political
Reform
Offer Official
Development
Assistance,
targeted toward
cultivating civil
society or
administering
free/fair
elections
Example: UK
ODA to civil
society in Syria
during the 2011
uprising.

Stabilize the
Environment
To the
government or
interim
government offer
moral, technical,
or training
support. Also
includes acts of
civilian
protection and
safe passage for
defectors.
Example: Iraqi
governments
persuasion of
Syrian
government to
accept an Arab
League observer
mission in 2011.

Pressure the
Targeted
Government
Sanctioning the
targeted
government,
halting military
aid, issuing
public critiques
of government
activity.
Includes
pressuring third
party actors to
act against the
targeted
government.
Example: U.S.
issuing financial
and travel
sanctions on
Burmese
officials during
the Saffron
revolution.

Bolster the
Movement

Equip the
Activists

Offer moral or
symbolic
support,
nonviolent
civilian
protection.

Offer
financial,
technical, or
training
support to any
type of
movement
participant that
is not an active
government
official.

Example:
Canadian
government’s
awarding of
honorary
citizenship to
Aung San Suu
Kyi in the
wake of the
2011 Saffron
Revolution.

Example:
Norwegian
government’s
covert
provision of
funds and
equipment to
Serbian
activists
during the
2000
Bulldozer
revolution.

The above five categories of support are crafted to put state behavior in terms that
plausibly correspond to the policy objectives they might further vis a via a protest
movement. As will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, states in my sample
ultimately provided one or all forms of support to movements. The types of support
provided comprises a sort of profile, which I refer to as a supportive repertoire. Taken on
their own, these supportive repertoires raise many questions as to their underlying
meaning. For example, what does it mean that both a rival and friendly state equip a
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protest movement – should we believe that those states can be grouped together as the
same “type” of supporter?
Consider that during the Anti-Apartheid struggle, Zambia equipped and bolstered
the movement, while pressuring the government through international fora like the
United Nations. It did so despite economic interdependence with South Africa. Zambia
imported food from South Africa and exported half of its copper (its primary export)
using South African rail and port infrastructure (Thompson 2001, 215). It is not sensible
to group Zambia with the United States who experienced none of the same costs, despite
providing similar forms of support in later years. 29
As subsequent sections will show, we need to introduce more information into the
analysis not only to understand the meaning of support provided, but also to engage in
global comparison. With this chapter I hope to have justified the use of an inductive
analytic approach, and to have laid the conceptual foundations for this approach, which
will culminate in measuring state commitment to protest movements. Measuring state
commitment requires empirical work that will illuminate the relevant conditions and
relational content that can distinguish states supporters – even those that offer similar
supportive repertoires.
The promise of using behavior and conditions to categorize can help to resolve
the overdetermination of the phenomenon and partition states according to their
unobservable, if detectable, commitment to a movement. The next chapter comprises the
29

Zambian support to the ANC despite threats of South African raids are case in point (Field 2007).
According to trade union members, Sweden supported sanctions despite Swedish companies in South
Africa suffering, and they did not try to maneuver around them like other countries [Gomomo Interview]
(Sellström 2002, 129).
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first step toward measuring commitment. I present a heuristic case study on the South
African Anti-Apartheid movement as a plausibility check on the core concepts introduced
here, and to provide preliminary validation of commitment as a useful differentiating
concept.

48

Chapter 3: Commitment and Convergence during the South African AntiApartheid Struggle

In South Africa between the 1940s and 1991 the government instituted and
operated a system of racial classification that allotted core civil rights according to one’s
ascribed race. The insistence of the South African government on maintaining its system
of institutionalized racism known as apartheid stood in stark contrast to the concurrent
global shift toward norms of universal racial equality and political participation (ReusSmit 2008). In addition to laws restricting interracial marriage and the right to be
educated in the language of one’s choice, nonwhites could not vote, organize, or enjoy
freedom of movement through their own country (Sisk 1995). The South African
government attempted to disown Black Africans, in particular, through the establishment
of Homelands - an effort to deny the citizenship of nonwhite population while preserving
the means extract their labor, which it veiled with euphemisms like “separate
development” (Thompson 2001).
Apartheid and the anger it provoked resulted in “cycles of revolution and
repression” (Sisk 1995) over four decades that galvanized a mighty international coalition
along the way. States were but one form of participant alongside international NGOs, the
United Nations, universities, grassroots activists, and corporations. Early support in the
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fight against racial discrimination began in the late 1940s with India, and soon
encompassed communist countries, former African colonies, and “radically neutral”
Sweden (Field 2007). Over the decades of the mass struggle, however, many more states
joined the effort or at least spoke out. The South African Anti-Apartheid Movement
stands out in the EX-D dataset for being supported by the highest number of foreign
governments. During the peak years of the mass movement phase (1980-1994), 70
national governments showed up to challenge apartheid in some form – which was more
than double the number supporting any other campaign in EX-D.30
The evolution of the global norm of racial equality and its role in the demise of
apartheid has been richly discussed elsewhere (Klotz 1995; Sisk 2013). This chapter
offers a different look at South Africa that expands the analytic focus from the
importance of global norms to include several other conditions that led so many national
governments to a shared policy objective of ending apartheid. Below, I draw out three
conditions that formed the basis for the international convergence seen at the peak of the
struggle: new levels of domestic mobilization and internal chaos not yet seen in South
Africa; the easing of Cold War related geopolitical tensions; and the persistence of a
deeply entrenched international discourse on racial equality.
According to data in EX-D, foreign government involvement in the AntiApartheid struggle peaked during the 3-year period of 1986-1988. This period coincides
with the fallout of the “ungovernability campaign” called by the ANC in 1984 and
township revolts in 1995, which generated new levels of mass mobilization and outright

30

The second-most supported campaign was the Syrian Uprising of 2011.
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chaos. The unrest triggered a brutal nationwide state of emergency that was broadcast
internationally, horrifying onlooking governments and their constituents. Importantly, the
unrest was preceded by breakthroughs in Cold War tensions and concurrent with the
economic decline of the Soviet Union, which led that state to formally end military
support to national liberation movements, including the ANC.
Still, a global reaction sympathetic to the movement was not inevitable. This
consensus among so many governments followed years of work by South African
organizations, transnational advocacy networks, international corporations, and
intergovernmental organizations. It was the depth of Anti-Apartheid discourse, cultivated
over decades, that allowed initially reticent nations to be folded into the cause when
political conditions allowed. As John Ruggie (1998) wrote, ideas (such as racial equality)
can be reasons that certain causes have certain effects. The entrenchment of racial
equality in international discourse explains why the international developments in the
1980s gave way to the end of apartheid versus the alternative outcome of galvanizing
governments to help the regime.31 The ultimate consensus on the abhorrence of apartheid
was so strong as to eventually unify the positions of the West and the nations of the
Soviet bloc.
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, I use the abundant documentation
on the Anti-Apartheid case to study its history and extract the conditions that led to
international convergence in 1986-1988. Later, I will extrapolate from these conditions to

He describes – in a Weberian sense – how “ideational factors” help explain why international events are
so and not otherwise (Ruggie 1998).
31
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inform the global study in chapter 4. Second, I use the wide familiarity with the mass
resistance phase of the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa to explore whether my
specified types of support (described in chapter 2) and identified conditions can be used
to group country supporters in expected ways. Particularly, I am interested to see if my
support indicators and conditions reasonably cluster supporters according to their quality
of commitment to the movement.
The next section offers historical context with an emphasis on mass action and
subsequent bilateral foreign responses. After this, I explain in more detail that
international convergence occurred against a backdrop of deep instability in South Africa,
facilitated by a favorable geopolitical environment, and guided by a well-developed
normative context.
Then, I present a quantitative analysis that uses multidimensional scaling (MDS)
to map contextualized involvement – or commitment – of the various state supporters
during the years 1986-1988. I provide evidence that my analytic approach can generate
clusters of states according to their commitment to the movement. The variables that
organize supporting states in the MDS solution serve as organizing principles that plot
state supporters relative to each other. In the South Africa case, states mostly are
distinguished according to the types of assistance provided, the nature of their bilateral
relationship with the South African government, and their embeddedness in the global
human rights regime. This analysis shows some indication that states cluster according to
their trade relationship with South Africa.
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The Anti-Apartheid Struggle: Pre-War II Period
South Africa has deep roots in nonviolent struggle and a long history of
prominent foreign influencers. Mohandas Gandhi pioneered the notion of passive
resistance during his time in South Africa between 1893 and 1914, lobbying for the rights
of Indians brought as indentured servants (Thompson 2001, 113, 171). His Natal Indian
Congress lived on as one of three groups forming the South African Indian Congress
established in 1919.
In that early period, resistance to pervasive discrimination was organized along
racial lines. The African National Congress was formed in 1912 by American and
British-educated black lawyers who until the First Defiance campaign in the 1950s strove
for political equality within the existing political structures. The African Political
Organization, an organization for “Coloured” people, emerged in 1902. More prominent
was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, founded by Clements Kadalie, an
immigrant from present day Malawi, who drew inspiration from the American Marcus
Garvey and Marxism. His trade union for “Coloured” dockworkers grew to national
stature. It broadened to incorporate high levels of Black membership and inspired early
instances of defiance across South Africa. By the 1930s, though, mainstream resistance
organizations had peaked in their efficacy, plagued by internal disagreements, a lack of
overarching strategy, and inability to achieve large-scale mobilization (SAHO n.d.). They
became “defunct” (Thompson 2001, 176) paving the way for a new phase of struggle.
The 1913 Natives Land Act outlawed Blacks from owning or leasing land outside
of designated reserves. The reserves constituted less than 10% of South African territory,
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though, despite the Black population considerably outnumbering Whites. The
confinement of Blacks to the reserves, (except for working on White farms, in White
households, or in the mines) meant severe overcrowding, abysmal educational systems,
and an inability to meet basic needs for sustenance. Over time, great numbers of Blacks
migrated into the towns to settle in shanty towns and seek work, despite restrictive
“influx controls” put in place by the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act (Thompson 2001,
178).32 Mass migration was accelerated by the draw of growing manufacturing centers,
fueled by the WWII economy. As the number of black urban poor grew, some made
efforts to organize. In 1943, for example, 20,000 people protested an increase in bus fares
with a 10-day boycott, which required them to start their day at 3am to walk to work.33
Important resistance by Black mineworkers took place during the WWII era. In
1941, the Transvaal Province ANC committee called a miners’ conference that resulted
in the formation of the African Mineworkers Union (AMU). After several years of
attempts to negotiate wage raises and improvement in working conditions, the AMU
waged a now infamous 4-day strike in August 1946 amongst gold miners on the
Witwatersrand – the gold mining capital outside Johannesburg. In this act, 74,000
workers refused to work –affecting eight different mines. The government used massive
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The year 1936 was also an important year legislatively. At that time, the South African government
passed the Native Trust and Land Act and the Representation of Natives Act. These laws increased the
percentage of land allocated as “reserves” (the areas preserved for exclusive black ownership) but also
eliminated parliamentary voting rights for Blacks in the Cape who retained them. From that point Blacks
were permitted to elect only three Whites to parliament in an assembly of 150 seats and otherwise were
represented by a Natives Representative Council, who only had advisory authority (SAHO n.d.).
33

Thompson (2001, 209) describes this and a similar boycott in 1957 around Johannesburg/Pretoria where
boycotters walked up to 20 miles per day.
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force to end the strike “[driving] men underground at bayonet point” (Thompson 2001)
among other atrocities. The killings, arrests, and assaults that characterized the
government reaction provided a glimpse of how it would react to the mass resistance to
come.
Soviet communism emerged as a formative foreign influence in this period. The
ANC made direct contact as early as the 1920s, when ANC president Josiah Tshangana
Gumede traveled to the USSR alongside South Africa Communist Party (SACP) official
James LaGuma (Kempton 1989; Sivograkov 1999). Kempton (1989) reminds us that the
treatment of South African Blacks was a topic of debate at the Fourth Congress of the
Communist International of 1922. The SACP, founded by Whites in 1921, elevated the
racial cause in South Africa above the class struggle as directed by Moscow in 1928
(Thompson 2001, 177). The close alliance and overlapping membership of the ANC and
SACP would be used many decades later by anti-communist Western powers as
justification to delay meaningful support to the movement.

Post-war Period (1948 – 1984)
Although a discriminatory legal framework preceded the formal institution of
apartheid in the late 1940s, in the post-war period the laws of exclusion and segregation
were expanded to govern personal life choices and completely bar nonwhites from
meaningful civic participation. When the Afrikaner National Party came to power in
1948, it instituted apartheid with a series of laws beginning with the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act in 1949. Then, in 1950 came the Immorality Amendment Act, the
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Suppression of Communism Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population Registration
Act.34 The formalization of Apartheid led the ANC to give up the idea of achieving
equality through a “constitutional struggle.” It turned at that point to passive resistance
(Mandela 1987, 220).
This new phase of the Anti-Apartheid struggle began with the First Defiance
Campaign, launched by a coalition of activist groups across racial lines in 1952. 35 In
April, the ANC and South African Indian Congress held rallies, and activists entered
European-only sections of train stations and post offices to protest segregation. In all,
over 8,000 people were arrested. The 1952 protests were extinguished within the year:
new laws passed in December such as the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Laws
Amendment Act deterred further activity, and the ANC called off the campaign. The First
Defiance Campaign and its quashing inspired a Congress of the People which adopted a
Freedom Charter in 1955 that called for a non-racial democracy in South Africa. That
document guided the work of the ANC and would ultimately be taken up by the United
Democratic Front (UDF) in the 1980s. The South African government responded to the
1955 adoption of the Freedom Charter by arresting 156 people considered leaders of the
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Other laws followed such as the Batu Authorities Act (1951) and the Bantu Education Act and Public
Safety Act (1953).
Women’s groups also got involved. The Duran and District Women’s League was formed in 1952, which
played a role in organizing marches during the First Defiance Campaign (Meer 1987, 240). The League
organized marches in Pretoria in 1956, and in support of “those detained in Durban” in 1960. It was banned
that year.
35
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Charter’s passage and trying them for treason. A South African court ultimately acquitted
all the accused.36
Pass laws had been a means for Whites to control the movements of slaves and
mine laborers long before the infamous Sharpeville protests of 1960. After the founding
of the Union of South Africa in 1910, Blacks were required to carry passes to justify their
presence in White urban areas. This served to subject Blacks to harassment over
inspection of the passes. Pass requirements separated those with rights to be in urban
areas to work from their families who did not have such permission. Enforcement of pass
laws waned during the WWII because of the great need for Black labor in urban areas.
But pass law requirements became more specific and demanding in the early 1950s.
Blacks needed to carry a more comprehensive set of identification documents and could
remain in White areas for no more than 72 hours without special permission, or be
arrested (McLachlan 1987).
Pass laws were the source of deep and acute anger, which translated into mass
action in 1960. Answering a call issued by the Pan African Congress (PAC), on March
21, about 5,000 people protesting pass laws marched to the Sharpeville township
government office. South African forces fired into the crowd, killing 67 black youth and
wounding 186 (Thompson 2001, 210). This initial protest was followed by acts of
resistance: marches, work stoppages, general strikes, and a culmination of a 30,000strong march in Cape Town (Stultz 1991; Thompson 2001).

Despite the government’s attempts to frighten activists with the threat of treason, resistance continued: in
1956 the Federation of South African Women protested the application of pass laws to women and 1959
saw protests by the National Union of South African Students (Thompson 2001, 209).
36
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At the international level, horror at the violent suppression of Sharpeville sparked
definitive bilateral and grassroots responses. The British House of Commons passed a
disapproving resolution on April 8, 1960 (Stultz 1991, fn 22). The US State Department
blamed the South African government for the deaths and casualties (Gerhart 1987, 215).
The Jamaican and Nigerian government boycotted South Africa alongside trade unions in
Ghana, Tanganyika, Rhodesia, Malaya, Cyprus, Norway, and West Germany (Houser
1982, 16). The receipt of the Nobel prize by ANC president Albert Luthuli after
Sharpeville demonstrated sympathetic Scandinavian attitudes. Solidarity marches broke
out in Sweden, Australia, India, England, and Kenya (Field 2007).
Over the 1960s multilateral action deepened, continuing the discourse on racial
equality in South Africa that began with Indian government efforts at the UN in the late
1940s. Multilateral action was forefront in the international response, persisting even as
foreign attention waned with the banning of the ANC, PAC, and SACP in the wake of
Sharpeville (Marx 1992).37 From the perspective of international support, whereas the
1950s could be considered merely “hortatory” in terms of activity at the United Nations
(Lyman 2002, 24), the 1960 Sharpeville massacre comprised a turning point. Action at
the United Nations intensified including a voluntary Security Council arms embargo and
the creation of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of
the Republic of South Africa, among other actions (see Figure 2 below).
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Although, the United States and Britain enacted arms embargos on South Africa in 1964 (N. Crawford
and Klotz 1999, appendix).
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International sports diplomacy began in earnest in the 1960s, which would deeply
pain the proud sports-loving country. Not only was South Africa excluded from the 1964
Tokyo Olympic games by the International Olympic Committee, but also its athletes
were not permitted to compete in the Commonwealth Games of 1961. Also in 1961,
South Africa was suspended by the Federation of International Football Association
(FIFA). In its boycott of sports exchanges with South Africa, the International Olympic
Committee forced subordinate sporting associations to follow suit, or also be excluded
from the Olympics (Kidd 1988). Faced with a widening boycott of the 1968 Olympic
games by many states, the IOC again excluded South Africa, and in 1970 expelled it.
In the 1970s, with the political opposition underground or in exile, labor
movements assumed the mantle of resistance. A 1973 workers strike in Durban involved
100,000 people. The wave of strikes that followed led to the government’s reluctant
legalization of trade unions in 1979, acknowledging their immutable political force. At
the time 27 illegal unions already existed (Thompson 212, 224).38 The decade also saw a
revival of civil society (Ottaway 2012, 87) as education expanded and Africans began to
enjoy some upward mobility. In this environment civil organizations led by educated
youth mobilized over rent increases, poor infrastructure, and more overtly political issues
like democratic rights (Seekings 2000, 13). 39 The 1970s saw the birth of the Stephen
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African trade union membership reached 1 million by 1986 between COSATU and the Black
Consciousness oriented Council of Unions of South Africa-Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions.
39

According to Ottaway, the revival owed not to the ANC but rather to grassroots organizations including
civil society organizations, newly legalized trade unions, and black consciousness groups.
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Biko’s Black Consciousness movement, and the silent protests by women of the Black
Sash (Thompson 2001, 205).
In 1973, Guinea, Nigeria, and the USSR put the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid forward to the UN General
Assembly, which was ratified by 1976. But it was the Soweto Uprising of 1976 that
turned the international tide even stronger against the government. On June 16, students
in Soweto township inspired by the Black Consciousness movement held a mass rally to
protest the law that mandated they be educated in Afrikaans language (Brooks and
Bruckhill 1987; Seidman 1987). The demonstration culminated in two days of acute
rioting, followed by months of strikes, boycotts, rallies (in the form of funerals to
sidestep laws against political gatherings), and some cases of arson (Brooks and
Bruckhill 1987, 234). Government repression resulted in 575 deaths over the course of 8
months, and a new fearlessness among black youth (Karis 1987). According to Waldmeir
(1997), the violent force used against protesters pushed 14,000 young people out of the
country to seek guerilla training.
The 1970s also saw an uptick in international economic pressure, highlighted by
the adoption in 1977 of the American Sullivan Principles and the European Community’s
Code of Conduct. These principles required workplace racial equality in American and
European companies operating in South Africa in terms of pay, facilities, training, and
upward mobility. As the ANC and PAC advocated internationally for “an end to
economic ties” with South Africa (Houser 1982, 24), these principles were meant to preempt the implementation of more drastic measures like economic sanctions. Most states
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supported the voluntary nature of the codes, but the Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark
wanted to make them mandatory (Klotz 1995).
Waldmeir (1997, 22) writes that Soweto “gave South Africa a worldwide
reputation for repression.” The violence outraged international activists and NGOs who
called for boycotts of South African goods and inspired further actions at the UN. Anger
deepened with the government’s killing of Black Consciousness leader Steven Biko in
1977. In November of that year, the UN Security Council escalated pressure by enacting
a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa (Stultz 1991). 40 The U.S. assent to the
embargo signaled the Carter administration’s approval of stronger opposition to
apartheid. In 1976, West German Chancellor Schmidt took advantage of a routine
courtesy call with South African Prime Minister Vorster in Bonn to openly criticize
Apartheid (Houser 1982; Kamm 1976). Select U.S. state and city governments forbade
the use of public funds in loans or investments in South Africa, a gesture that would
become more widespread with time. And, the Dutch parliament abrogated a cultural
treaty with South Africa in 1981, having already frozen cultural relations in the late
1970s (AP 1981).

Mass Action Phase (1984 – 1994)

40

According to Houser (1982, 30) the United States actively enforced this embargo by, for example,
holding the Sabre Research Corporation (SRC) accountable for shipments of shells and gun barrels to
South Africa through Antigua. It reported the legal case to the United Nations, which resulted in jailtime
for 6 SRC associates.
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Sensing an urgency to offer a semblance of reform, in 1983, the South African
government proposed a new constitution that awarded separate parliamentary chambers
to Whites, “Coloureds,” and Indians. The proposal excluded Blacks, which comprised
72% of the population at the time (Lyman 2002, 33). The reform was taken by the
resistance, rightly, as evidence that the regime maintained no intention of instituting
universal franchise. The prospect of folding Indians and “Coloureds” into the government
while excluding Blacks motivated a call for a united front of resistance. The resulting
United Democratic Front (UDF) rallied a coalition of around 600 grassroots
organizations from all races, although its adherence to the 1955 Freedom Charter
alienated certain Africanist groups (Seekings 2000). Internationally, the United
Democratic Front epitomized “the grassroots struggle of black South Africans”
(Landsberg 2012). Its membership would grow to over one million people. Early UDF
activity included a lackluster Million Signatures Campaign, but a largely successful vote
boycott of the tricameral constitution. Both efforts contributed to launching the UDF to
national prominence.41 Meanwhile, affiliated organizations continued local level
resistance in the form of rent strikes and marches in the townships.
Ultimately, parliament approved the tricameral constitution, which occurred in a
context of intensified enforcement of the pass laws and urban influx controls (Danaher
1987, 249). The seating of the new parliament coincided with a period between 1984 and
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In May 1984, on behalf of the UDF Cas Saloojee and Murphy Morobe received a human rights prize and
financial award from Sweden. In September of the same year, seven UDF affiliated activists sought and
were granted reluctant refuge in the British consulate in Durban, protesting the government’s practice of
detention without criminal charge. The British consulate protest resulted in the retreat from preventative
detention by the government, garnered new international attention, and buoyed the movement (Seekings
2000, 116-118).
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1985 known as the township revolts. Upheaval began in the Vaal Triangle in September
1984 (Amnesty International 1987; Seekings 2000), and spread nationally. Widespread
resistance seen in the wake of the new constitution escalated to include more violent
measures like sabotage and attacks on police (Thompson 2001, 229), executed by both
the ANC and domestic grassroots actors (Seekings 2000, 135). The ANC, for its part,
took the adoption of the new constitution to mean that new measures were needed for the
movement to progress. In radio addresses ANC leadership including President Oliver
Tambo called for outright disobedience - a campaign to make South Africa
“ungovernable.” In 1985, it distributed copies of the ungovernability message throughout
the country (Field 2007; Seekings 2000).42
Ungovernability coincided with a “people’s war” by the ANC, which saw
intensified militant action, and new acceptance of civilian casualties.43 Meanwhile,
consumer and rent boycotts spread across South Africa at the grassroots level, sometimes
enforced upon community members with violence. While the ANC intensified
confrontation, the UDF advocated “people power,” which entailed the creation of
alternative governing structures. Township governments were collapsing and being
replaced with so-called “street committees” coordinated from above by the ANC and
UDF (Seekings 2000, 169). Nationwide stayaways were organized by the Congress of
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Also in 1985, government officials opened fire on a funeral procession coinciding with the 25th
anniversary of Sharpeville. Later called the Uitenhage (Langa) massacre, an estimated 20 people were
killed.
Tambo said “before the end comes, we expect rivers of blood to flow. Streams have started, and it will
take the international community only. We are hopeful to restrict the duration of the slaughter” (Field
2007).
43
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South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and drew in millions – these took place in May
1986 and May 1987.
The government predictably met this dynamic period with repression, but this
time the world watched with greater attention. A partial state of emergency issued in July
1985 gave way to an expanded national version in June 1986. Tens of thousands of
arrests were made, driving the UDF and local organizations underground, causing
COSATU to take precautions, as well. Media restrictions, curfews, and banning of
meetings occurred simultaneous to government attempts at township development to
redeem the apartheid system. Security forces engaged in beatings, disappearances, and
executions (Field 2007). Resistance in the form of rent boycotts, stayaways, and an
“unban the ANC” campaign occurred despite the state of emergency (Seekings 2000,
207-209). By February 1988, though, the UDF was banned alongside 16 other
organizations.
Shocking coverage of repression reverberated globally during that time, with
images revealing states of outright military occupation of the townships. The unrest and
states of emergency triggered deep concern by onlooking states over the stability of
South Africa. In the 1980s, divestment campaigns in the U.S. took hold, seeing state and
city governments, and 119 educational institutions restrict investment in South Africa
(Lyman 2002, 33). The U.S. passed comprehensive sanctions in 1986 over President
Reagan’s veto with a crippling provision that ended new investment and new technology
transfers. The U.S. then refused engagement with the government and instead offered
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legal assistance to government victims, investigated protester deaths, and supported local
nonprofits (Olson 1991).
As Sisk (1995, 74) writes of the end of the 1980s “the interaction of reform,
revolt, and repression had yielded a political stalemate, one that imposed unacceptably
high costs on the system and the struggle.” Talks amongst unlikely parties were taking
place: between the exiled ANC and business leaders in 1985; between ANC leaders and
the South African government in England over three years between 1987-1989; and
secretly between the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and the South African Minister of
Justice. At the same time, the USSR was winding down its support to all liberation
campaigns in Southern Africa, including to the ANC, pushed by a deteriorating
economy.44 It agreed in 1988, alongside the United States, to the tripartite peace accords,
which ended South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, and arranged for the removal of
Cuban troops from Angola (Thomas 1996, 200).45 Cold War tensions were easing. In
December, Nelson Mandela wrote to President P.W. Botha with urgent interest in a
political settlement (Thompson 2001, 245).
In 1989, South African President P.W. Botha suffered a stroke, lost his party
leadership, and was replaced as president by F.W. De Klerk. Seeing a political settlement
as the only path to retaining some degree of political power, De Klerk sought to seize

Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted as much: “There was a time when the
Soviet Union was associated with the struggle against colonialism and the liberation of these countries from
the colonial yoke. We rendered material, moral, and military assistance and spent a great deal on that.
Today our capabilities are limited. We all know the conditions we live in and the situation in our country”
(Landsberg 2004, 48-50).
44

45

Chester Crocker had worked toward for the previous eight years, being the centerpiece of his
“constructive engagement” foreign policy (Lyman 2002, 36).
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initiative by announcing suddenly in 1990 the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and
the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and SACP. In turn, the ANC announced an end to its
armed struggle. A series of talks unfolded over the next year and a half, with intensified
political violence in the background centered in Natal between the ANC/UDF and
followers of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Three separate milestone agreements were
needed before the ANC, the government, and IFP arrived at a National Peace Accord that
established common commitment to nonracial democracy and institutions for managing
the political violence that almost scuttled the peace process (Sisk 1995).
During this time, the international community’s stance toward the Anti-Apartheid
struggle had switched from proponents of the movement to champions for negotiations
and reconciliation. The 1980s had seen an influx of official development assistance
flowing to civic organizations, including local groups affiliated with the UDF. However,
when negotiations took hold in the early 1990s the groups that had received the bulk of
foreign aid were now passed over as assistance flowed to civic activities such as political
party training, voter registration, human resources administration, and violence
prevention programs. This shift resulted in resentment among the nonprofit community
so abruptly left behind (Landsberg 2004).
International actors now shifted their orientation toward mass action –
discouraging it given its potential to spark new violence and jeopardize talks (Lyman
2002, 64-68). At the same time, bilateral support faded into the background, supplanted
by multilateral efforts. Foreign governments wanted peace in South Africa. They made
that clear with UN Security Council resolutions that condemned political violence,
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appointed a Special Representative to identify ways to end the violence, and the
establishment of the UN Observation Mission in South Africa. UNOMSA peace
observers were in South Africa almost two years, joined by observers from the European
Community, Commonwealth of Nations, and the African Union (then the Organization of
African Unity) (United Nations 2021).
The ANC and South African government persisted in their negotiations through
violence, political power wrangling, and deadlock to travel the arduous road between the
National Peace Accord and democratic elections in April 1994. Each breakthrough met
subsequent upticks in political violence (Sisk 1995, 243). After two rounds of
constitutional negotiations, a Record of Understanding and, finally, the Multiparty
Negotiating Process, a date was set, and kept, for democratic elections. Sisk (1995, 13)
attributes the success of the negotiations to the stubborn symmetry in bargaining power
between the ANC and the government. The ultimate institution of nonracial democracy
however, owed to something deeper: the convergence upon a new “broad based,
multifaceted social contract.”

Unrest and International Convergence
The story above recounts the basic story of the anti-apartheid struggle – a century
long effort that evolved from racially-stratified organizations of the early 20th century to
unified mass demonstrations, armed struggle, international mobilization, and finally
political settlement reached amidst political violence that alarmed the international
community. International convergence preceded the domestic sort by only a handful of
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years - it too, took decades, and a specific configuration of forces to materialize. Not until
the mid-1980s did international actors of all forms - nongovernment and government coalesce around the anti-apartheid cause in a rare moment of global consensus.
The data in EX-D show concretely when convergence among nation-states
occurred. Figure one below shows that international support for the movement peaked
during the years 1986-1988. The number of states involved grew markedly with the onset
of ungovernability and the township revolts in 1985. The states of emergency drew in
even more supporters until 1988. The sharp drop in state support in 1989 points to the fall
of the Berlin wall, when the collapse of the bipolar international system diverted
international attention. Foreign government support peaked again suddenly in 1990,
however – corresponding to a watershed of approval offered in response to the release of
Nelson Mandela from prison. Even governments that had previously stayed on the
sidelines like Italy and Syria spoke out for the first time.
The chart also shows

Figure 1 International Presence in South Africa

that during the peak of
foreign government
involvement between 19961988, supporters were
offering more diversified
supportive repertoires
relative to other years. In
Figure 1, the red line provides a sense of support depth. To get its value, I first summed
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the number of support types provided by each country in each year using the categories
proposed in Chapter 2: bolstering, enabling, equipping, stabilizing, and pressuring. Then I
aggregated all country scores for each year, which offers a rough expression of
cumulative bilateral support. The higher the red line relative to the bar, the more
diversified was the support provided. In 1986, more states provided varied forms of
support than in 1990. It will be shown later that the states providing diversified support
were those known as particularly committed to the struggle.
What led to this period of convergence? The years in question correspond to
fallout from the ungovernability campaign and township revolts, which saw 1,600 deaths
between September 1985 and June 1986 (Cowell 1986). Importantly, foreign media
documented the subsequent state of emergency, witnessing South African security forces
apply intensified repressive techniques, the images of which galvanized global outrage.
At the nation-state level, heads of government began to fear that South Africa would
devolve into some form of state collapse. Rothchild describes it like this:

Earlier experiences with sanctions in Ethiopia and Rhodesia showed how
difficult it was to unite sovereign countries for concerted action; even so the
moral indignation that existed over apartheid had proven to be unique in
providing a basis for the use of extensive international diplomatic pressure to
break the fatal drift toward the worst possible outcome; a deadly stalemate in
intergroup relations. (Rothchild 1997, 210)

James Baker, former US Secretary of State, remembered his job (which he assumed in
1989) as “fashion[ing] a policy that reduced the chances of [a racial holocaust]” (Baker
and DeFrank 1995).
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As shocking as repression during the state of emergency was, and for as much
moral indignation it inspired, two other conditions were in place that enabled
convergence. First, operating in the background throughout the 1980s was a significant
easing of Cold War tensions, aided by the economic collapse of the USSR. In these
critical years, shifts were occurring within the USSR and internationally producing
change in the bipolar international system. Second, a deeply engaged transnational
activist community had successfully set the global discourse in such a way that once
political opening occurred, all states hewed in the direction of ending apartheid.

Geopolitical Easing
Prior to international convergence, geopolitical interests defined by the pressures
of the Cold War shaped the support provided by key states to the movement. The USSR
was an early and prolific supporter. It provided critical military support to the ANC
(which was allied with the South Africa Communist Party) beginning in 1961.46 In
addition to sending weapons and ammunition shipments to training camps established in
Tanzania and Zambia, it provided backing in multilateral organizations like the United
Nations and trained individuals at Soviet universities and “military centers” (Sellström
2002, 146). Through the Soviet Peace Fund, it sent food, clothing, school materials,
medical supplies, and building materials to ANC camps outside the country.

46

The ANC itself was banned in 1960 leading to the formation of its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe in
1961. According to Kempton, Mandela claimed that the ANC was internally financed until its banning,
upon which it required support specifically for the armed struggle.
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Soviet support to the ANC reflected its interest in a Soviet-friendly government in
South Africa that would facilitate its access to strategic naval and air facilities and
minerals (Vanneman 1990, 96). After the decline of the Soviet economy in the 1980s and
the shift to negotiations in South Africa, the USSR adjusted its policy objectives. The
USSR became more interested in reputational capital. It sought primarily to appear as coequal to the United States in the region. But also, by supporting the turn to negotiations,
the USSR aimed to convey itself as a progressive force with the ability to project power
globally (Vanneman 1990, 96).
In contrast, the U.S. had strong ties to the South African government and many
reasons to withhold support for the Soviet-linked ANC. Overall, the U.S. saw South
Africa as a reliable friend given its contributions in both World Wars (Thomas 1996;
Lyman 2002). The two countries cooperated in Cold War pursuits as well, specifically,
the joint funding of the UNITA insurgency in Angola beginning in the 1970s (Lyman
2002). UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher similarly had concerns about the Cold War
balance. She once said, “It is absurd that people should be prepared to put increasing
power into the hands of the Soviet Union on the grounds that they disapprove of
apartheid in South Africa" (Klotz 1995, 118). The UK under Thatcher was interested in
maintaining the “family connection” with countries of its former empire including South
Africa (Landsberg 2004, 25). It, like the US, strongly resisted economic sanctions against
the South African government.
During the 1980s, however, important developments eased positions on both
sides. The USSR softened its position toward market economics and allowed some form
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of elections through the now infamous policies known as perestroika and glasnost. A
1985 Geneva summit and a 1986 Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev
signified an important transition in the US-USSR relationship (Carnegie 1997). Then, in
1988, the US and the USSR jointly facilitated the tripartite accords that achieved South
African relinquishment of Namibia (which it had occupied since WWI) and Cuban
military withdrawal from Angola (Waldmeir 1997, 135). Landsberg (2004, 46)
considered the thawing of tensions to have been critical in the defeat of apartheid. He
cites periodicals of the period calling the accords probably "the most far-reaching great
power agreement on Africa since the Berlin conference of 1885.”
The new geopolitical atmosphere paved the way for international actors to unify
their positions with respect to the South African government. The United States opened
dialogue with the ANC in 1987 (Lyman 2002, 46). At a March 1989 meeting hosted by
Britain between Pretoria, Washington, and Moscow “the U.S. and Soviet delegates
operated like a team; as if the Cold War has already ended and both sides ostensibly
subscribed to the principles of genuine democratization” (Landsberg 2004, 62). 47 De
Klerk’s own words speak best to the shifting dynamics:

The first few months of my presidency [commencing in September 1989] coincided with the
disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe which reached its historical climax with the
fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Within the scope of a few months, one of our main
strategic concerns for decades - the Soviet Union's role in southern Africa and its strong
influence on the ANC and SACP - had all but disappeared. A window had suddenly opened
which created an opportunity for a much more adventurous approach than had previously
been conceivable. (quoted in Landsberg 2004, 86)

Landsberg (2004, 48) writes that in the mid-1980s, Moscow began to “nudge the ANC in the direction of
free market economic policies” at least in part to benefit from an economically stronger South Africa given
its own economic travails.
47
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Not only did USSR-US tensions ease, but also USSR-China relations improved.
Bilateral talks between the USSR and China began in 1979. And, in 1981 the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union finally recognized China as a socialist country (Joshi 1987, 61).
Talks held in 1979, 1982, and high level meetings in 1984 put the relationship on more
positive footing (Joshi 1987). Beijing’s moves toward reconciliation with Moscow,
aiming to generate a sense of distance from the US, opened the way for it to form a
relationship with the ANC after 1983 and ultimately supported the commencement of
negotiations with the government later in the campaign. By the end of the decade, the
ANC was recognized by all key international players as a central actor in a struggle
worthy of their support.

Normative Entrenchment
As deeply affecting as the geopolitical developments were, their manifestations
could not have guaranteed the international convergence of nation-states upon the
political objective of ending apartheid. In John Ruggie’s 1998 essay “What Makes the
World Hang Together?” he explains that ideas – like the abhorrence of apartheid – if not
direct causes, can be the reasons that certain causal factors have certain effects. He draws
on Max Weber, writing that ideas can produce “an outcome that is historically so and not
otherwise. Absent those ‘reasons,’ however, and the same ‘causes’ would not have the
same causal capacity” (Ruggie 1998, 869). Finnemore (1996) writes in the same spirit
claiming that international norms create “permissive conditions for action but do not
determine action.” In the context of South Africa, this framing is useful for understanding
why geopolitical easing and deep instability coincided with an international consensus
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that apartheid had to fall. The decades of diplomacy, activism, and resistance
internationally generated a shared discourse on the unacceptability of apartheid.
The United Nations was a

Figure 2 Key UN Action on South Africa

principal arena for such discourse. In

1946: General Assembly consideration of
discrimination against Indians in South Africa.

December 1946, the General Assembly

1950: General Assembly declares apartheid
racial discrimination.

took up the issue of discriminatory
policies against Indians in South Africa.
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This came only one year after the

1952: Establishment of UN Committee to Study
Racial Situation in South Africa.
1954: General Assembly resolution claiming
apartheid to be a grave threat to peaceful
relations between ethnic groups in the world.

creation of the UN itself. In subsequent

1960: Security Council condemns South Africa.

years the General Assembly passed

1961: General Assembly calls for states to
consider bilateral action (rs 1598)

more resolutions condemning apartheid
as a whole and established special

1962: Founding of the Special Committee on
the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of
the Republic of South Africa

committees to study it (Stultz 1991;

1963: UNSC implementation of voluntary arms
embargo

Houser 1982).49 In those early days of

1965: Creation of UN Trust Fund for South
Africa

the global struggle, though, many

1977: UNSC resolution 418 implementing
mandatory arms embargo on South Africa

countries clung to Article 2(7) of the
Charter, which featured
noninterventionism, and they opted not

1984: UNSC resolution 558 voluntary
prohibition importing military arms and
vehicles from South Africa
1986: UNSC resolution 591 enhancements of
military equipment prohibition
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Such offending policies included the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which sparked
a passive resistance campaign in South Africa and lobbying in New York by the ANC and South African
Indian Congress (SAHO 2011; Stultz 1991).
49

The Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa stands
out for its wide advocacy in the 1960s among IGOs and nation states, and shifting in the 1970s to engaging
nonprofits in countries with “substantial trade” in South Africa (Stultz 1991, 10).
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to openly criticize the regime (Stultz 1991). Attitudes changed, though. By 1972 the UN
Trust Fund for South Africa would receive financial support from 66 nations (Houser
1982, 19).50 As the campaign progressed, the UN Security Council agreed on concrete
action, particularly on a mandatory arms embargo in 1977. 51
International activists also set the discourse on apartheid, mobilizing within the
deep layers of international society inaccessible to multilateral diplomacy. With each
major event in South Africa activists around the globe turned out in solidarity. Global
protests broke out after the Treason Trials, Sharpeville, and Soweto (Field 2007). The
United States saw the largest student protests since Vietnam (Field 2007) and activists
succeeded in instantiating a massive university divestment campaign throughout the
1980s. In some cases, activists were mobilized with the help of international
nongovernment organizations. The International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) in
London, the World Council of Churches, and TransAfrica played critical roles in getting
out demonstrators, keeping apartheid on the international human rights agenda, and
amplifying the movement’s call for economic sanctions.
Although most states waited until the political opening of the 1980s to
bandwagon their support for the movement – others showed a deeper progressivism and
played a role in turning the international tide against apartheid. Certainly, individual
nation states were the ones to drive the actions taken at the UN, which began with India.

According to Stultz (1991), the trust fund “was to coordinate and centralize legal, educational, and
humanitarian assistance to victims of apartheid and their dependents, including refugees.” It had collected
$31.2 million by March 1988.
50
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Britain and France abstained from the 1960 security council resolution. Sources for tonebox: (Stultz 1991;
Houser 1982; SIPRI 2012)
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Sweden, Denmark, and Norway provided sustained support to liberation movements well
before convergence. Swedish support to the movement began in the 1960s, funneled
initially through the UN, reaching $300 million by 1990 (Thomas 1996; Landsberg
2004). The IDAF received Nordic funding (Sellström 2002). Evidence from the period
depicts a diverse international activist coalition against apartheid that was diverse,
resourced, and organized.

Clusters of Commitment
The conditions leading to convergence against apartheid in the mid- to late-1980s
underlie a particularly high-profile case whose international backing has not been
replicated in any mass nonviolent movement since. Still, the history of support to the
movement reveals instructive variation in qualities of commitment across state
supporters. In this final section, I consider how to extrapolate from the history of antiapartheid struggle to identify variables that differentiate state supporters according to
their commitment to the movement. This inductive move offers the opportunity to
hypothesize about and test a strawman case before proceeding to a global study in the
next chapter. Below, I offer evidence that anti-apartheid supporters cluster in “zones” of
commitment visualized with a technique called Multidimensional Scaling (MDS)
(introduced in more detail in Chapter 4 and explained in more detail in the
Methodological Appendix). MDS depicts state supporters of the movement according to
their similarities and dissimilarities on key variables. I restrict this analysis to supporters
active during the “period of convergence” (1986-1988), which should maximize both the
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number of supporters and variation in support. I describe each key hypothesized variable
now.
The diversity of supportive repertoire provided should help distinguish state
supporters according to their commitment to the movement. Recall the comprehensive set
of support by the USSR to the struggle, which corresponds to a long-standing, wellknown commitment to the ANC. Also, India offered diversified support by leading
condemnations of the apartheid system in the UN, being the first to boycott South
African goods, and assisting South African exiles obtain passports (Thomas 1996).
Finally, note that multi-model support was more common during the peak period of
1986-1988 when the movement faced crushing government repression. Not all states
responded with enhanced support during this time, but many did, suggesting useful
variation. Thus, the nature of the assistance provided merits inclusion in an analysis
clustering states according to their commitment. To this end, I include in the MDS binary
indicators coded 1 or 0 for each support type the state offered. This introduces five
different “stimuli” corresponding to the type(s) of support introduced in Chapter 2:
bolstering, equipping, enabling, pressuring, or stabilizing.
As discussed previously, however, the conditions underlying the observed support
– whether in the form of context or relational content – must also be considered to further
discriminate between state supporters according to their commitment. I introduce four
proposed variables here. First, we have reason to believe that supporting states vary in
their buy-in to presiding international human rights norms. The South Africa case
demonstrated that certain post-Colonial African states and India were forefront in
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addressing political and human rights within international institutions like the United
Nations. 52 Some states proposed resolutions and launched special committees to confront
the profound violations of human rights occurring in South Africa. Fariss (2014) created
a variable that can concretely measure the degree to which a country subscribes to the
global human rights regime. Higher scores on this human rights embeddedness variable
indicate countries that have ratified many treaties and conventions, signaling more
investment in human rights norms. Thus, I include as a stimulus in the MDS a variable
indicating with a “1” that a supporting state had an above average level of embeddedness
in the global human rights regime.
Then, I use EX-D to generate a variable indicating whether domestic
nongovernmental actors in the supporting state assisted the anti-apartheid movement in
the same year as the government. The South Africa case indicates this could help
distinguish between supporting states. As described above, the anti-apartheid campaign
saw ample and passionate transnational solitary protests, divestment campaigns, and
corporate pressure, which plausibly drove some governments to deepen their
commitment. In the United States representatives of congress, some affiliated with the
lobbying group TransAfrica, famously protested alongside activists.53 Meanwhile, Klotz
(1995) reasons that the parliamentary system in the UK shielded Margaret Thatcher from
domestic pressure. The application of domestic pressure on one’s government to act in
defense of human rights globally corresponds to the so-called boomerang effect coined
52

This is also well documented on a general level by Reus-Smit (2013).

53

Finnemore (1996) mentions that US intervention in Cambodia against the Khmers Rouges appears to
have been driven by domestic opposition to the brutality of regime.
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by Keck and Sikkink (1998). It is of interest to judge whether it can help distinguish
between state supporters.
Two potentially important dyadic variables – or indications of relational content –
emerge from the South Africa Case. First, the nature of a state’s bilateral relationship
with the targeted South African government seems to have played a role in shaping a
supporter’s orientation to the struggle. The United States, which held deep historical
affinity for the South African government and shared geostrategic goals took a more
timid approach to addressing apartheid than “radically neutral” Sweden (Field 2007).
And, note that the newly independent Zimbabwe, liberated from a minority government
in 1980, took a novel adversarial approach to South Africa once in power and deepened
support to the movement. Given the apparent importance of bilateral relationship, I
included a stimulus indicating whether the supporter and South Africa were considered
either serious or weak rivals based on the categorization scheme created by Goertz,
Diehl, and Balas (2016).
Second, the importance of economic relations with the target likely distinguishes
between supporting states in terms of their commitment. The case of Zambia, which
supported the campaign in all ways possible despite the economic (and security)
ramifications, stands out for supporting the movement at high cost to itself. Zambia’s
behavior stands in stark contrast to China, for instance. Before the warming in relations
with the USSR, the PRC aimed to cultivate an image of supporting national liberation
movements to generate prestige for itself on the world stage. After the relationship with
the USSR and the ANC improved, China’s policy changed from (albeit haphazard)
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support to the Pan African Congress to consisting merely of “anti-apartheid posturing
whilst encouraging negotiations” (Taylor 2000). The nature of its commitment became
clear, though, from evidence that in the 1980s it was undermining the economic sanctions
the international community lobbied so hard to implement.54 Given the likely importance
of economic ties, I included an indicator as to whether a supporter had prominent trade
with South Africa, defined here as ~1% or more of the supporter’s GDP, based on the
Correlates of War Bilateral Trade data (Barbieri and Keshk 2016).

Figure 3 MDS Plot of Anti-Apartheid State Supporters (1986-1988)

54

Crawford (1999, 62) describes the acquisition of 35,000 AK47s from the PRC by South Africa from
1985-1989 by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa. The arms embargo against South Africa was
lifted in 1994. Taylor (2000) describes China’s purchase of minerals from South Africa and export of grain
through the 1980s.
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Figure 3 shows the MDS solution, which maps the 52 state supporters that
assisted the movement during the period of international convergence (1986-1988). The
2-dimensional MDS solution is a relatively good fit to the data, with the model
explaining 86% of the variation in the distances between observations. Of note, the plot
shows at center the movement’s most ardent supporters: Russia (USSR), Sweden,
Zambia, India, and Canada. Directly above those states in the top center, we mostly see
states that were both ardent supporters of the movement, and active rivals of South
Africa. The axes in Figure 3 are labeled according to the principles that organize
observation in this space. The x-axis organized states according to the nature of support
provided. The y-axis placed them according to the quality of political investment each
had in the struggle.
We can interpret the axis as such given the following dimensional analysis
allowed by MDS. As will be described in the next chapter, in addition to depicting
distances, MDS solutions are useful for detecting underlying structure in data that is not
immediately obvious to the human eye (de Leeuw and Mair 2009). Figure 4 displays a
series of plots that show how underlying values on key variables correspond to an
observation’s location on the plot.
Along the x-axis, states are placed according to their supportive repertoire. States
in the middle of the plot demonstrate more dynamic repertoires, offering multiple kinds
of support. Most clearly, they bolster the movement and pressure the government. Those
that equipped the movement, tried to stabilize the environment, and offered ODA are also
in the central swath. For example, Botswana bolstered and pressured, and India equipped

81

the movement and pressured the government. The United States provided all types of
support except offering ODA (which it started later). Countries on the left extreme
limited supportive repertoires to bolstering the movement, whereas at the right extreme
they opted only to pressure the South African government.55 This is our first indication
that states do not support movements in a simple low to high sort of variation.
The y-axis, on the other hand, has organized countries according to variables that
signal their political vestiture in the movement. Specifically, countries above zero on the
y-axis demonstrate either trade dependence on South Africa (in which case they limited
their support to bolstering) or a bilateral rivalry (where they provide dynamic repertoires
of multiple types of support). There is a third reason a state would be above zero on the
vertical axis: it demonstrates lower than average embeddedness in the global human
rights regime. This is the case for the United States.
According to the plot, all supporters of the Anti-Apartheid movement between
1986-1988 below zero on the vertical axis are well-embedded in the global human rights
regime. No other variables included in the MDS solution provided such clear
interpretation of a dimension. The demarcation of the y-axis according to this variable is
striking and will be shown to be replicated in the global analysis.
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In these specific cases, Ireland, Israel, and Malaysia applied pressure for the release of Nelson Mandela.
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Figure 4 South Africa MDS Variables

One last consideration of interest is the dynamics displayed along the full vertical
central swath of the plot. As mentioned, this area corresponds to active supportive
postures – a repertoire used by states willing to confront the South African government
directly and aggressively. States with this repertoire are either highly embedded in the
global human rights regime, such as Canada, Denmark, or Sweden, or, they have a
bilateral rivalry. South Africa’s rivals are concentrated in the top-center of the plot,
corresponding to active supportive repertoires. The relevant states in this central zone of
the chart include: Cuba, Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia. 56
Rivalry here is based on the Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016, 35) variable. A ‘1’ for rivalry here indicates
either a severe rivalry (a relationship where the military component of foreign policy is important, and
conflicts between the states are linked), or a lesser rivalry (both states see the use of military force as a
legitimate means for resolving disputes, but the method is less frequent or serious than in severe rivalries.
56
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This shows that states assume active repertoires for more than one reason. Finally, states
with active repertoires likely see concurrent domestic support for the movement. No
countries with narrow supportive profiles saw domestic constituents advocating for the
Anti-Apartheid movement.
In summary, multidimensional scaling has provided preliminary evidence that
states can be clustered according to their latent commitment to a protest movement.
Rivals with certain political ambitious clustered together as did the ardent supporters of
the movement. On the left and right margins of the plots we see states that offered
narrower support and are not considered by historical evidence to have had particular
interest in the movement. These states comprise bandwagoners and those signaling
weaker support for human rights.
Furthermore, the case study provided several inductively achieved insights that
were needed before approaching a global study. Findings relevant to the global study are
as follows:
•

Supportive repertoires demonstrate a deeper-in-the-middle dynamic. These dynamic
supportive postures are associated with rivalrous bilateral relations, or high human
rights embeddedness. In both cases, active supportive repertoires correspond to an
interested domestic constituency also supporting the movement.

•

States with trade dependence on South Africa tended to offer only bolstering support
and did not pressure the government.
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•

The United States emerged as an anomaly. It clustered with active rivals of South
Africa based on its dynamic repertoire but was unique for its active support provided
in the absence of HR embeddedness, rivalry, or trade interests.

In the next chapter we will see whether the conditions that differentiated supporters
during the anti-apartheid struggle remain relevant in a more recent, global sample.
As a hypothesis generating case study the South African Second Defiance
Campaign has had several advantages. First, as the nonviolent maximalist campaign most
widely supported by foreign governments in the EX-D dataset, it offered the opportunity
to test my concept of mapping commitment zones against a sample of countries with
wide variation in involvement. Second, the movement is well-documented by secondary
sources. The deep reserve of knowledge of the campaign meant that I could fit the EX-D
data to it and see if they behave as expected given the facts of the case. We saw from
South Africa that state postures vary in intuitive, but not immediately obvious ways. In
the next chapter, I use the insight gained here to inform a global analysis of 95 state
supporters to 65 different maximalist campaigns.
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Chapter 4: Zones of Commitment
.

In Chapter 2, I argued that state commitment to a protest movement could be
understood as a sort of contextualized involvement and when measured it should provide
more textured insight into state support to movements. In this chapter, I use multiple
quantitative methods to map state commitment to protests using a global sample. I show
that there are three ideal types of state supporters, differentiable by the nature of their
commitment to a movement. One type is the willing revisionist that is antagonistic to the
sitting government, at best agnostic to the global human rights regime, and very
interested in the movement’s success likely because of the political implications for itself.
The second type: an institutional steward that works with the sitting government as much
as, if not more than, with the campaign. It refrains from public pressure, targeting gradual
reform. The third is the grievance legitimizer. These states engage in public diplomatic
tactics, issuing public condemnations, sometimes sanctions, and shows of moral support
to signal its approval. It keeps arms-length distance from the movement itself, refraining
from active measures on the ground. This group is most consistent with an instrumental
approach to support for movements.
Identifying ideal types rather than a formal typology optimally conveys the three
types of state supporters present in EX-D (see the Methodological Appendix for more

86

discussion on typology versus ideal types). Notably, scholars of International Relations
are more accustomed to generating either descriptive or explanatory typologies (Elman
2005). Ideal types allow me to transcend this restriction built into existing typological
epistemology and consider how descriptive and explanatory variables together comprise
types of foreign supporters. As described by Jackson and Nexon (2013), the ideal typical
approach is useful for mapping phenomena of interest and identifying organizing
principles. In this approach, an observation will occupy a space on that map never
epitomizing the ideal type itself, but rather differ from it and other observations in
measurable ways. The zones of commitment provide concrete insight into social
regularities, and “enable orientation to the social world” (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2009).
The concern of this analysis with both observed behavior and the elements that
contextualize it corresponds to the original intent of Weberian ideal types. According to
Swedberg (2018), Weber considered social behavior to be action infused with meaning.
Thus, although traditional quantitative analysis in political science tends to separate the
observed behavior from explanatory conditions on opposing sides of a regression model,
this analysis integrates them. Such an approach is not unprecedented. Esping-Anderson’s
study identifying the three worlds of welfare capitalism characterizes the welfare regime
types both in terms of the type of benefits provided and the conditions that differentiate
them (Esping-Andersen 1990).57 Both Swedberg and Ahlquist and Breunig (2012)
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Esping-Anderson (1990) also separates analysis of welfare states in terms into two parts. First, he
explains what makes them different (quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship
between the state, market, and people), then he provides causal factors of what brings them about (the
nature of working-class mobilization, class-political coalition structures, historical legacy of regime
institutionalization).
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mention the relative dearth of attention paid to methods of extracting ideal types. This
chapter addresses that gap directly.
To get to ideal types and depict their expanse I first generate a new latent variable
that summarizes the types of state support as a continuous variable. To do this I specify a
Bayesian Item Response Theory model for the five support type indicators. Articulated in
Chapters 2 and 3, these are bolstering, enabling, equipping, stabilizing, and pressuring
support. The interpretation of the variable is interesting in its own right: negative values
indicate a state supporter that relied on active measures to support the campaign such as
equipping a movement or sending ODA funds. Positive values indicate a strictly
diplomatic approach – public condemnations or statements of support, for example. The
middle range of the variable signifies highly involved state support engaging in both
active measures and diplomatic gestures – a hybrid repertoire corresponding to the most
enthusiastic postures.
In the second step I embed the state postures into their relevant context again
using multidimensional scaling (MDS), which visualizes state supporters according to
their commitment to the movement in two-dimensional space. Using variables shown to
be important from the South Africa case study, I show with MDS how supportive
postures, human rights embeddedness, and dyadic foreign policy distance act as key
organizing principles on this ideal typical map. Of note, in this global analysis, domestic
civilian support does not appear to differentiate state supporters. Finally, imposing a 3cluster k-means solution over the MDS plot shows concretely how the zones of
commitment are situated and which state-protest dyads they include. To make the ideal
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types more concrete, I provide one vignette of each ideal type. The details of the
quantitative analysis are articulated in the Methodological Appendix. Below I focus on
describing the main findings as non-technically as possible.

Bayesian IRT Variable
I used a 2-parameter Item Response Theory (IRT) model, estimated in the
Bayesian framework, to create a variable that conveys the quality of a state’s supportive
posture toward a protest movement – its outward behavioral attitude. The model takes in
the five indicators of support types and converts them into a single latent scale. My
indicator variables assume the value of 1 or 0, depending on whether a state provided
each category of support at least one time over the duration of the campaign’s peak years.
These support types are bolstering the movement, enabling civil society, equipping the
movement, stabilizing the environment, or pressuring the government. For clarity, I refer
to this latent variable simply as one that measures that quality of a state’s “involvement.”
The Bayesian approach to estimating involvement is necessary because my data
demonstrate the two key features that make traditional frequentist approaches
problematic (Western and Jackman 1994): first, the EX-D data constitute all available
observations from a population during the period of interest. Therefore, frequentist
probability assumptions are not relevant because my dataset is not a sample from a larger
population, and parameter estimates will not converge on their true values with repeated
sample draws. Second, the data are not very informative about the parameters estimated
given the low frequency of certain indicators relative to others (i.e., stabilizing support
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occurs rarely compared to enabling

Figure 5 IRT Variable Indicator Frequencies

Bolster
0
1

Freq.
633
146

Percent
81.26
18.74

Total
81.26
100.00

Equip
0
1

Freq.
560
219

Percent
71.89
28.11

Total
71.89
100.00

support). Figure 5 shows how often
states provided each type of
support. Furthermore, my dataset is
rather small – I have 779
observations consisting of state-

Enable
0
1

Freq.
224
555

Percent
28.75
71.25

Total
28.75
100.00

Pressure
0
1

Freq.
620
159

Percent
79.59
20.41

Total
79.59
100.00

campaign dyads. The
unconventional structure of the
dataset merits mention; in my
dataset each supporting state
appears as a unique observation for

Stabilize
0
1

Freq.
721
58

Percent
92.55
7.45

Total
92.55
100.00

each movement that it supports.58
There are 95 unique state supporters
that assisted at least one of 65

maximalist movements.
The IRT model provides estimates for two parameters that aid in the interpretation
of the involvement variable called item discrimination and difficulty (see the Appendix
for more detail). In this section, I focus on discrimination because of the insight it

58

The state-movement dyad unit of analysis may raise concerns that repeated measures of states that
supported multiple movements should be accounted for. I attempted to incorporate random effects for
states, movements, and a cross-classified model with state and movement effects. The data however do not
support their use – incorporating random effects required constraining all indictors positive/negative for
identification and ultimately yielded much higher standard errors than the simple model. Additionally, 53%
of the supporters in the sample supported a single campaign whereas the most prolific supporter (the United
States) supported 61 campaigns. This extremely unbalanced structure puts into question whether a random
effect makes substantive sense.
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provides into the latent continuum. Difficulty parameters for each item, reported in the
methodological appendix, mostly were not statistically different from zero.
IRT discrimination parameters can be thought of as factor loadings: items with
large discrimination parameters provide the substantive content to the continuum being
measured (Jackman 2001). They also are indicative of an observation’s likely value on
the latent variable. The sign of the discrimination parameter tells us toward which end of
the latent continuum an observation will trend – positive discrimination means that item
pushes an observation toward the positive end of the scale. Item Characteristics Curves
(ICC) illustrate discrimination across each item, displayed in Figure 6. Steeper curves
indicate a more informative stimulus – in other words, a steep curve means that small
Figure 6 Item Characteristic Curves
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movements along the latent scale translate to notable changes in the likelihood of a state
offering that support.
Consider the indicator variable enable - it has a highly negative discrimination
parameter, corresponding to a steep negatively sloped ICC. This means that states
offering this type of support will trend heavily toward negative values on the latent
variable. They could be pushed less negative if they offer support with positive
discrimination parameters. Bolster and pressure have positive discrimination values, and
correspondingly would push a unit’s involvement score toward the positive zone.
Stabilize and equip are rarely offered support types relative to the other indicators (they
have the highest “difficulty”). These two items have low discrimination parameters, but
are signed positive and negative, respectively, having slight effects on an observation’s
score.
We can look to the discrimination parameters to describe tendencies in foreign
government supportive postures. Of interest is that enabling and equipping support both
have negative discrimination patterns. In plain language, supporting governments that
equip movements materially are mainly those that also provide official development
assistance to enable civil society through government channels. The concurrence of
material support for the movement and the enabling of civil society through the targeted
government itself is surprising and discredits the idea that states that equip campaigns are
inherently anti-regime. In fact, the dataset shows only 39 cases globally where a foreign
government equipped the movement without also enabling civil society through official
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channels. Equipping nonviolent resistance movements as a hostile actor, therefore, is not
as common as targeted autocratic regimes would have us believe.
It now becomes possible to interpret the spectrum of involvement underlying state
support to movements, which is summarized in Figure 7. The two indicators with
negative discriminations comprise the “active measures” portion of the posture spectrum.
Conversely, the indicators pressure, bolster, and stabilize have positive discrimination
parameters. Together these forms of support together can be considered “diplomatic”
aspects of support. State supporters with positive values on the latent variable are
choosing public advocacy rather than material forms of support. This echoes the finding
from the South Africa case study that state postures towards movements cannot be
encompassed by a simple “low” to “high” or friendly to hostile scale. Rather, we see a
novel qualitative continuum. Also, similar to South Africa, countries with relatively
dynamic postures lie in the middle of the scale – these countries strike a hybrid posture
entailing both active measures and diplomacy.

Figure 7 Summary of IRT Variable Interpretation

Location on
Scale
Support Types

Active Measures

Hybrid Repertoire

Negative values up
to negative one
High chance of
enabling civil
society through
official. channels
(i.e., ODA). Some
chance of equipping
the movement.

Negative one to
zero
Supporter’s
repertoire includes
both active and
diplomatic
measures.
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Diplomatic
Actions
Positive Values
Higher chance of
bolstering,
pressuring, or
stabilizing.

Figure 8 demonstrates the dynamics of the latent variable in more concrete terms
using the Syrian Uprising as an example. Second to the South African Anti-Apartheid
Movement, the Syrian Uprising received support from the most diverse set of foreign
government supporters in EX-D. The dot-plot below shows each supporter’s involvement
score. Countries most negative on the latent variable had a posture defined by offering
ODA via the Syrian government intended to benefit civil society. This characterizes the
support provided by Ireland, Finland, Norway, and Belgium. The United Kingdom’s
value near zero demonstrates the hybrid approach – the government provided ODA, but
also adopted diplomatic measures such as publicly boosting the movement and pressuring
the government. As can be seen in the figure, most countries, from Israel to Egypt
supported the movement only in sense of publicly pressuring the government. Pressure in
this case meant public condemnations, and possibly sanctions. Iraq holds the most
positive value on the latent variable here because it provided all three forms of diplomatic
support – it bolstered the movement, pressured the government, and offered stabilizing
support.
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Figure 8 Foreign Involvement Scores of all States in the Syrian Uprising

*Involvement Scores show that the international response to the Syrian Uprising primarily comprised diplomatic
responses, which is evident because most supporting countries have values above zero. Relatively fewer countries
assumed hybrid postures (France, the UK, the US, and the Netherlands – all of whose scores were between -1 and
zero). Certain states avoided public diplomacy, opting to restrict support to ODA (Belgium, Norway, Finland, and
Ireland).

Summarizing government posture toward movements on a single continuum is
further useful for readily judging which states vary their support toward movements and
which demonstrate internal consistency. The complete answer to that question lies
outside the scope of this dissertation but is an area ripe for future investigation. States
with varied postures toward movements might indicate ones more responsive to political
conditions and self-interest. Recall the South Africa case study and the difference in
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behavior between the United States and Sweden. Sweden assumed a consistent
supportive stance toward the movement overall and the ANC as an organization very
early whereas the United States did not intensify its support until the onset of favorable
political conditions of the mid-1980s. Indeed, as shown in Figures 9 - 11, the
involvement variable demonstrates much larger overall variation in American stances
than in Swedish ones. China’s postures across movements are also intriguing – showing
almost perfect consistency toward the movements it supports, which all lie within its own
geographical region.
Figure 9 USA Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014)

*US Involvement Scores indicate that it assumes all types of postures including active measures
(x-axis values of -2 through -1), hybrid repertoires (x-axis values of -1 through zero), and
diplomatic measures (x-axis values above zero).
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Figure 10 Sweden Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014)

*Sweden’s Involvement Scores indicate that it primarily takes active measures (x-axis values of
-2 through -1). Sweden assumed a single hybrid repertoire toward the Green Revolution (the
point between -1 and zero). Sweden took a diplomatic posture toward the Syrian Uprising (i.e.,
the single point above zero).
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Figure 11 China Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014)

*China’s Involvement Scores indicate that it takes exclusively diplomatic measures in response to protest
movements given that all its involvement scores are above zero.

Analysis of the estimated latent variable I crudely call “involvement” answers the
first portion of this dissertation’s motivating research question – what postures do states
assume toward protest movements? Using IRT to analyze the five indicators of support
shows that states take a posture of active measures or diplomatic acts, or some
combination of both. The following section turns to the conditions that contextualize
these supportive postures and best distinguish between state supporters.

Mapping State Supporters
As discussed in Chapter 2 meaningfully characterizing foreign support to a protest
movement requires going beyond observing supportive behavior. A country that engages
in support to a campaign despite the hardship it might bring must differ from one that
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provides assistance at little cost to itself. The difference between a supporter willing to
bear costs to itself, and one that supports as a matter of convenience is a function of
commitment to the movement. In that vein, this section presents a map of state
commitment to protests as a culmination of the analysis presented thus far. The
visualizations presented below contextualize involvement in protest movements amongst
variables relating to the movement-supporter-target “triad” (San-Akca 2016). I again use
multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to depict state-protest dyads in two-dimensional space
based on their relative similarities to one another. For this global sample, I overlay a 3cluster k-means solution that visually partitions the different zones of commitment. I then
offer a vignette of a state-protest dyad that is most characteristic of each commitment
zone – in other words, the dyad that is closest to the zone’s ideal type. I point out one
interesting outlier, and a borderline case.
In the global study, I carry forward the variables used in the South Africa case,
but I use them in their continuous form (versus discrete). Similar to before, I construct a
profile for each observation that includes observed support (now condensed into a single
continuous variable called “involvement”) alongside important contextual and relational
variables. Learning as we did from the case study the importance of human rights
embeddedness, trade, and the presence of domestic support, these variables are included
in the global MDS analysis. However, I change the variable measuring the quality of the
bilateral relationship. The South Africa study used a categorical rivalry variable, but in
the global study I use a variable called as “foreign policy distance.” This variable, created
by Bailey et al. (2017) measures the alignment of foreign policy preferences between
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countries based on UN voting records. I could not use this variable in the case study
given South Africa’s suspension from the United Nations General Assembly between
1974 and 1994.
Figure 12 Descriptive Statistics for MDS Auxiliary Variables

Variable

# Obs.

Mean

Human Rights
Embeddedness

779

1.786

Standard
Dev.
1.253

Trade
Dependence

746

.001

Presence of
Civilian Support

779

Foreign Policy
Distance
Share of Dyadic
Military Capability

Minimum

Maximum

-2.395

4.697

.006

0

.143

.116

.32

0

1

775

-1.592

.911

-4.327

-.001

710

.666

.299

0

1

Given the global nature of the sample, I add one additional variable of prominent
interest in International Relations – relative power. I use the Correlates of War Composite
Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) measure to create a variable measuring the
supporters’ share of dyadic capabilities (Singer 1987). Plausibly, states that are weaker
than the targeted government would be less likely to offer active measures, hoping to not
provoke retaliation. At the same time, a weak state supporting a foreign protest targeting
a stronger country likely has a notable level of commitment if not to the movement itself,
then to human rights more broadly. Figure 12 shows basic descriptive statistics for the
contextual variables included in the MDS. State-protest dyads with missing values on one
or more contextual variables were still included in the MDS analysis, but their
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dissimilarities from other observations on the missing variable were not considered for
the MDS visualization.
A two-dimensional solution that incorporates all the variables described above
yielded a .11 stress level meaning that the solution depicts 89% of the variance in the
distances between observations. Figure 13 shows the MDS plot for the global sample.

Figure 13 MDS Solution for Global Sample

To determine the variables most responsible for the placement of observations in
the map, I conduct visual dimensional analysis. I find that like the South Africa findings,
the nature of support provided, human rights embeddedness, and an indicator of bilateral
relations (here foreign policy distance rather than rivalry) give clear meaning to
dimensions showing us the conditions that most differentiate state supporters. Figure 14
shows how closely the x and y-axes correspond to those three key variables.
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The x-axis is well defined by negative to positive involvement scores and high to
low embeddedness in the global human rights regime. Immediately, we see that states
assuming active measures toward movements are also those highly embedded in the
global human rights regime. Interestingly, recall that states taking active measures are
those refraining from acts of public diplomacy. Thus, it is interesting that states
embedded in global human rights choose to approach movements with direct, but quiet
acts of support. The unembedded states on the positive side of the x-axis, rather, limit
their support to acts of public diplomacy.
Figure 14 Variables that Define Dimensional Interpretation

The y-axis is well determined by the distance in foreign policy preferences
between the supporting and the targeted state. States on the positive side of the y-axis
have very different foreign policy preferences from the target state, and those in the
negative zone are more aligned. The plots in Figure 14 show that supporters with large
foreign policy distance with a targeted state offer a range of supportive repertoires
ranging from active and diplomatic measures, or both. Thus, foreign policy distance (or
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bilateral relationship) is not enough to predict how a state will respond to a movement. I
return to this below.
The global analysis does not show that relative power between supporting and
targeted states helps to differentiate between supporters, as can be seen in Figure 15.
And, it brings into question the relevance of trade ties and domestic support – two
variables that seemed important in the South Africa case study. These variables show no
discernible pattern along the x and y axis, as shown in Figure 15. In terms of relative
power, it appears that most supporters are relatively stronger than the targeted regime.
Thus, support for protest movements is not a weapon of the weak as is perhaps state
support for terrorism. Regarding domestic support, contrary to the South Africa case,
there is no discernible pattern, and its presence is relatively rare. Still, this discrepancy
between the role of domestic support in the South Africa case and the global sample
makes sense: the Anti-Apartheid movement saw remarkable levels of grassroots support,
so it is plausible that it shaped support at least in some states. The disappearance of
civilian support in the more recent global sample, which lacks a movement of similar
global attention, suggests the domestic support may not be as much of a factor in driving
Figure 15 Variables that Do Not Define Dimensional Interpretation
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state behavior on a general level. It shows that overall, achieving the boomerang effect is
quite difficult.
The ability of trade to cluster states in the South Africa study but not in the global
study is also of interest. Supporters of contemporary movements simply do not tend to
depend trade-wise on targeted regimes. However, even though deep trade ties are rare
and the extent of trade has no identifiable pattern in the global sample, this is likely
insufficient to rule out economic ties as a useful way to distinguish between state
supporters. Simple exchange of goods and services as a percentage of supporter’s GDP
likely is too weak of a signal in the 21st century to register organizing effects. According
to the South Africa case, trade did seem to matter, but economic exchange and reliance
today is surely more complicated than only trade flows. Measuring economic dependence
in the 21st century probably requires a more sophisticated measure of economic
dependence, which I leave for future research.

Defining the Zones of Commitment
A visual inspection of the MDS plot maps shows state-protest dyads mapped not
in discrete clusters, but rather as a principal mass of supporters in the lower left with two
extensions toward the upper and lower right. This pattern suggests graduated change
across the dimensions, which supports the choice of extracting ideal types rather than
discrete typological categories. In this section I present my approach for extracting ideal
types from the MDS plot, and I introduce each one with a corresponding example.
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Using a k-means clustering algorithm, I superimposed a range of clusters over the
MDS solution in Figure 11 experimenting with 3 – 6 clusters to find the best fit. Then, I
examined the mean values of the MDS variables described above for each cluster. The
means depict the idealized center of the zone. To use Jackon and Nexon’s language, the
center quantitatively expresses “an idealization of a phenomenon’s characteristics that
can then be compared against other, related empirical instances” (P. T. Jackson and
Nexon 2013). The 3-cluster solution demonstrated the clearest differentiation between
groups.
Figure 16 shows which variables most define each cluster, but I consider all
variables to propose ideal types. From the mean values, I can infer the quality of
commitment a supporting state in each zone might have toward the corresponding
campaign and use that to name each cluster. I argue that the three clusters encapsulate
three ideal typical state supporters being: the willing revisionist, grievance legitimizer,
and the institutional steward.59 The nature of each supporter ideal type and its
commitment to the movement are explained in more detail below. Although no state
exactly encompasses the ideal type, my approach allows for the identification of the most
prototypical case: the vignette provided below is the state-protest dyad located closest to
the idealized center in Euclidean distance.

According to Swedberg (2018, 188) “ideal type should be constructed in such a way that the effect of the
social action it describes is clearly linked to the motivation of the actor. This way, so-called ‘causal
adequacy’ is ensured.”
59
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Figure 14 Ideal Type Characteristics

Cluster Posture

1

-.452

Human Rights Foreign Trade
Embeddedness Policy
Depend
Distance
1.24
-2.70
.0008

Civilian Ideal Type
Support

2

.207

-.232

-.553

.0015

.198

3

-1.3

2.41

-1.43

.0013

.0344

.295

Willing
Revisionism
Grievance
Legitimation
Institutional
Stewardship

Zone 1: Willing Revisionism
The first ideal type exemplifies a state with a tolerance for disruption to the status
quo in the target country. By tolerance for disruption, I mean the state is willing to disturb
existing conditions for the sake of movement success, or otherwise significant political
change. On average, these states have the lowest values of embeddedness in the global
human rights regime, and the highest value of foreign policy distance with the targeted
regime. Although domestic support for movements is rare in this global sample, this zone
sees the highest likelihood of domestic support for the movement. These qualities are
perceivable both in the mean values that define the ideal type, and by the location of the
cluster on the plot. The position above zero on the vertical dimension indicates significant
foreign policy differences with the targeted government, and the position to the right of
zero on the horizontal axis suggests lower levels of human rights embeddedness.
One final note about this zone: it shows wide variation in supportive postures
unlike the other zones. While the institutional stewards are couched firmly on active
measures side of the x-axis, and the grievance legitimizers are on the diplomatic side, the
willing revisionists encompass states offer all combinations of supportive repertoires. The
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relatively vast variation in posture among this group merits investigation, but it is clear
that revisionists act on their interests in very different ways.
On a broader level, note the positive trend along the x-axis for this group (seen in
Figure 13 or 17) – as states increase their foreign policy distance from the targeted state,
they become more likely to engage in supportive diplomatic measure toward the
movement. This implies that supporters with deep differences in foreign policy
preferences with (and in some cases, enemies of) the targeted regime are more likely to
publicly condemn and less likely to be materially involved in support of the movement. It
is both interesting and counterintuitive from our more usual conflict-based orientation
that hostile states are the ones limiting their support to arms-distance encouragement
versus tangible support.
Figure 15 Shapes of Commitment
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US support to the Anti-coup Venezuela Campaign emerges as a central dyad in
this first zone, and thus an illustrative example of the willing revisionist supporter. The
Anti-coup Venezuela campaign took place in 2002 following the forced removal of
President Hugo Chavez from power by senior military officers. Prior to the coup, Chavez
had instigated public anger over controversial economic reforms that concerned land
reform and the oil industry. Opposition business organization Fedecàmeras, and a union
(Confederaciòn de Trabadores de Venezuela), called general strikes and marches
beginning in December 2001 that culminated in violence between pro and anti-Chavez
camps in early April 2002. The military coup took place on April 12, 2002, and the head
of Fedecàmeras, Pedro Carmona Estanga, took over government. He remained in power
only until April 14 in the wake of mass resistance to the new government and salvaged
military support for Chavez (Human Rights Watch 2003).
According to Human Rights Watch, the US originally cast blame for the coup on
the behavior of the Chavez government. Ultimately, though, it condemned the coup for
transgressing the Venezuelan constitution, issuing critiques both in the Organization for
American States, and bilaterally, through statements by the Secretary of State, Colin
Powell. Throughout the crisis, the US continued sending ODA in support of human and
civil rights. According to media reporting from the time, the United States was aware in
advance of the coup plot. Criticism was waged that the US did not do enough to stop it,
although government officials claimed they tried to dissuade the opposition from
executing the coup and issued general warnings to Venezuelan officials of the threat
(Forero 2004).
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The US support for the Venezuela anti-coup campaign exemplifies the willing
revisionist ideal type given its values on the key variables proposed by this dissertation. It
is relatively unembedded in the global human rights regime and has a troubled bilateral
relationship with the targeted government. The US was, and remains, an advocate of
disruption to the status quo in Venezuela, and opposed to the Chavista form of governing.
Against these conditions, US support to the movement included a supportive repertoire of
both diplomatic and material gestures.
The U.S. – Venezuela case also suggests that certain state supporters may be more
agnostic to the characteristics and political desires of the particular movement being
supported than we might expect. Intuitively, the United States should have been less
enthusiastic in its support for a campaign that supported the restoration of Chavez to
power given the political differences therein. The US in its critiques of the coup, though,
alleged an interest in the restoration of the constitutional process in Venezuela – not the
reseating of Chavez, specifically. Even so, the US spoke out in support of the pro-Chavez
protesters’ objectives. To put another way, the US struck a revisionist posture toward a
movement that was seeking restoration of the status quo that the US opposed. The blurred
alignment of US foreign policy goals and the goals of the campaign that it supported
raises the question of the degree to which a protest movement’s goal matters to the state
crafting the response.
One final point about the US as an actor is its heavy presence in the willing
revisionist zone. In fact, US observations comprise most observations in this zone, and
nearly all of those which assume hybrid postures. In the reproduced Figure 18 below, I
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highlight the US observations in Zone 1 with darkened points. These are located high on
the y-axis suggesting wide foreign policy differences, and central to the plot overall
suggesting dynamic supportive repertoires. The US stands out as uniquely willing to
actively support a protest in unfriendly territory.
Figure 18 US Observations Dominate the Dynamic Portion of Zone 1

Zone 2: Instrumentalist Grievance Legitimation
The second zone of commitment encompasses those states that do not wish to
disrupt the status quo, but rather to substantiate the merit of the protesters’ grievance.
Zone 2 resides in the bottom right of the plot. Its state-movement dyads opt to restrict
their engagement with movements to diplomatic means. They are very unlikely to be
embedded in the global human rights regime, meaning they have ratified few
international conventions. In this zone, more so than in the others, supporting states have
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higher average trade dependence on the targeted state. Thus, even though trade appears to
be a weak signal, this group shows some signs of being influenced by economic
considerations. With little obligations to human rights conventions and countervailing
pressures because of the trade relationship, these supporters choose public diplomacy
over silence. Then, why support at all? This zone appears to contain the instrumentalists –
in particular, regional actors are prominent here: such supporters could be speaking out to
quell possible instability that could encroach on them. Or, they may be seeking a voice on
regional matters to project leadership. Both policy objectives are compatible with a
commitment to a movement that goes only as far as legitimizing its grievances and
hewing to the status quo as long as circumstances permit.
Angolan support to Cote d’Ivoire Pro-Ouattara Campaign exemplifies this ideal
type. The Pro-Ouattara campaign was a series of resistance actions in response to the
November 2010 runoff elections in Cote d’Ivoire between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane
Ouattara. Neither candidate won the first-round outright and competed in a runoff
election. The United Nations certified Ouattara as the winner of the run-off, but Gbagbo
appealed the results to Cote d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council. The Council, stacked with
loyalists, annulled the election results based on irregularities, violence, and a deadline
technicality (Cook 2011). The dispute led to dire post-election violence. Pro-Ouattara
protests met violence from pro-Gbagbo security forces, and by February, youth militias
from both sides were seizing territory from one another, targeting foreigners, and
engaging in gun battles in residential areas. Reports of the time noted rising violence late
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February – early March 2011, which coincided with refugee outflows to Liberia and
Guinea. By the end of March 2011, at least 460 people had been killed.
Angola was a reluctant supporter of the campaign and putting Ouattara in power.
It opted initially for supporting Gbagbo’s victory. According to Martins (2011) Angola
was the only country present at Gbagbo’s illegitimate swearing in, and initially offered
conflict mediation support.60 Martins attributes this behavior on one hand to Gbagbo’s
support to Angola in countering UNITA rebels, and on the other hand to Angola’s large
presence in regional politics. Amidst increasing violence and refugee flows, Angola
offered official acknowledgement of Ouattara as the rightful leader of Cote d’Ivoire in
late March, which coincided with the objective of the campaign. The coincidence of
Angola’s changing position with increasing indications of transnational stability echoes
the finding of the case study that the specter of instability has the power to bring
sideliners newly into the fray.

Zone 3: Institutional Stewardship
Zone 3 resides the bottom left of the MDS plot, corresponding to the densest
region. Here is the core constituency of foreign state supporters of civil society and
human rights. Its members consistently take tangible measures to enable and equip civil
society in the targeted state. But, these supporters shy away from public diplomacy. This
quieter zone of support includes states motivated to achieve reform but also preferential
of gradual change. These state supporters are highly embedded in the global human rights
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The instance of conflict mediation was not detected by EX-D.
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regime. Notably, not engaging in public diplomacy efforts like pressuring the regime or
bolstering the movement does not mean that such supporters are not expressing
disapproval behind closed doors (Lyman 2002).61 Still, as it relates to the movement, these
countries would not appear terribly committed to its goals, seemingly focused instead on
reforming regimes from within.
German support to the Nepalese Anti-Government Campaign lies nearest to the
center of this zone of commitment. The Nepal Anti-government crisis began early in the
rule of King Gyanendra who after coming to power in 2001 dismantled the constitutional
monarchy that had been in place since 1991. He dissolved parliament, dissolved the
constitution, and declared a state of emergency. A coalition of opposition parties, trade
unions, and Maoist Communists launched a campaign aiming to restore democracy. The
coalition waged an all-encompassing national strike beginning on April 5, 2006.
Participants called for a tax boycott, defied curfews, and braved violent repression and
arrests. The King ultimately agreed to reinstate parliament on April 24th, and Girija
Prasad Koirala was elected Prime Minister (Abbass 2010; Human Rights Watch 2005).
Germany provided no direct support to the movement itself, and we did not detect
diplomatic gestures relating to the unrest. Rather, at the time, Germany had small ODA
programs ongoing in Nepal dedicated to strengthening civil society (AidData #62717907,
and #67599033). This behavior is consistent with the broader Germany-Nepal bilateral
relationship. Outside of the mass campaign context, Germany is a principal bilateral
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As Ambassador Princeton Lyman writes in his memoir of the transition process in South Africa, Chester
Crocker offered to limit public criticism as an incentive for the South African government to go along with
his tripartite accord (Lyman 2002, 32).
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donor to Nepal, which suggests a more sustained interest in seeing Nepal democratize
that goes beyond the mass movement. Media reports from the period indicate that
Germany had provided over $1 billion in aid since the 1970s. Furthermore, following the
2006 Peace Agreement between Maoists and the government Germany pledged $42
million for development projects (Deutsche Presse Agentur 2006).

Outliers and Borderline Case
Plotting state-movement dyads in zones of commitment allows for facilitated
identification of outliers and borderline cases. Such examples allow for examination in
deeper detail of the usefulness of the ideal type scheme. Israel is a useful outlier worth a
closer look. According to EX-D, Israel has publicly involved itself in three maximalist
campaigns since 2000: those in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Showing remarkable internal
consistency, each of Israel’s supportive relations are plotted at the top right of the map –
demonstrating active diplomatic gestures in support of movements targeting governments
with which it has great foreign policy differences. Israel exemplifies the idea that staunch
adversaries of the target government are not inclined to take active measures in support of
a movement.
The United Kingdom’s involvement in Ukraine’s Orange revolution provides an
illustrative borderline case. According to the k-means solution, the UK’s support to the
Orange Revolution lies in group 3 – the institutional steward. But its location on the
outermost edge of the zone 3, and proximity to zone 1 and zone 2 makes it interesting to
examine more closely. According to our data, the United Kingdom offered both official
development assistance to the Ukrainian government and engaged in equipping the
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demonstrators – a clear Institutional Steward repertoire. However, its low level of human
rights embeddedness relative to others in the cluster pulls its rightward on the x-axis.
Thus, even though the UK is located amongst a group of democracy promoters, its
location on the border of the zone due to low embeddedness may put into question the
human rights flavor of its policy objectives.
The plotting of state-movement dyads in three zones of commitments has
illuminated several novel dynamics of foreign government support. With the respect to
the willing revisionist zone, first I noted that its members demonstrate the widest
variation in supportive postures. Second, this zone shows us that states particularly
hostile to a targeted government are less likely to take active measures in support of a
movement. On one hand, this makes sense because hostile state involvement with a
protest movement, if discovered, would allow the targeted government to link the
movement with an acute national rival, thereby seriously jeopardizing its popular appeal.
On the other, a hostile state may not get materially involved in order to not distract from
the targeted government’s mismanagement of its domestic affairs (Meernik 2001).
Third, we saw that the United States emerges as a unique actor within the set of
willing revisionists. It stands out for its strong action taken in support of protests
targeting countries with which it has a difficult bilateral relationship. And finally, willing
revisionists, although robust supporters of the movement, may only be peripherally
interested in a movement’s specific goals.
The other two zones provided novel insight, as well. Institutional stewards, or the
traditional democracy promoters, tend to refrain from public condemnations or visible
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bolstering of the movement. These states offer a quieter support and seem less interested
in the success of the movement itself than the manifestation of democracy, broadly
speaking. Finally, grievance supporters, the likely instrumentalists, limit their support to
diplomatic gestures. They may, like Angola, be particularly likely to come off the bench,
so to speak, in the face of deepening instability both as a measure of self-preservation or
to project regional leadership.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications

On February 1, 2021, armed forces in Burma declared a state of emergency and
forcibly detained the leaders of the National League for Democracy, which had just won
an electoral majority of seats in parliament. The military stated the election was
fraudulent. Thus far it appears that the democratic reforms promised following the
Saffron Revolution have indeed proved temporary. The coup has been followed by mass
protests, which while tolerated at first, within two months have met with mass
government violence against activists resulting in 107 dead in a single day. The coup – in
which the military prevented the certification of a newly elected government – rings
familiar given the events of January 6, 2021 in the United States.
As these terrible events unfold in Myanmar, and elsewhere, major data projects in
political science such as Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy agree that overall,
the world is becoming less democratic (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021; Luhrmann et al.
2021). Not only that but scholars have begun to observe that autocrats are refining their
toolkits while movements may be becoming less organized (Chenoweth et al. 2019). This
project showed that even though a single state – the United States – is willing to actively
challenge unfriendly regimes through support to civil society, most states are not. The
foreign plot accusation appears to be exaggerated and not reflective of reality. Most
willing revisionists publicly oppose the regime at arms-length, while most democracy
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promoters work with the government quietly behind the scenes. As for those states that
legitimize the movement’s grievances through diplomatic channels - they appear to do so
when stability concerns arise, or when they stand to accumulate useful political capital.
This dissertation aimed to make sense of the variation in foreign government
behavior toward maximalist nonviolent protests such as the one in Burma in early 2021.
For a range of stakeholders it is useful to know on a general level the types of state
supporters that show up to these events and what sort of political baggage they bring.
This dissertation’s inductive approach to grouping state supporters by observed behavior,
context, and relational content has highlighted some counterintuitive patterns that gesture
toward equifinality of state assistance. This is to say that similar repertoires of support are
undergirded by varying configurations of conditions. State support to movements, I have
shown, is not monocausal, unidimensional, or fully described on a simple spectrum of
low to high support.
I found that characterizing the supportive behavior can be done productively if
couched in a foreign policy making frame. This specificity is necessary to cut through the
ambiguity resident in key political science orientations of interests, institutions, and ideas.
Support to maximalist movements cannot simply be a story of states pursuing their
individual interests. The behavior of Sweden and Zambia during the Anti-Apartheid
struggle shows that some states are willing to endure economic and material costs to
uphold human rights. It also cannot simply be a story of democracy promotion. The span
of countries that spoke out in favor of the Syrian Uprising includes both democracies and
autocracies. Finally, ideas and international solidarity do not provide full explanation,
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either. In fact, supporters are well distinguished by varying orientations to the global
human rights regime. Only one of three ideal types – the institutional stewards – showed
significant embeddedness in global human rights and ironically, the states in this zone are
reticent in the public sphere. The more vocal states are those most likely to be seeking
direct political gains, possibly at the expense of the targeted government.
The framework offered here invites analysts to consider how support to a
movement enables or discourages outcomes that are compatible with a state’s
overarching foreign policy objective. However, whereas a supporting state executes
foreign policy, movement actors rather perceive states with varying forms of commitment
to their cause. The expanded categorization scheme of support accommodates both
perspectives. The five supportive categories here – bolster, enable, equip, pressure, and
stabilize – strike the balance of being specific enough to offer useful information while
being general enough to apply to a global sample.62 These categories proved useful for
generating a scale that measures state involvement. We learn that states will choose one
of three general supportive repertoires: an active approach that enables and equips civil
society, a diplomatic approach that stays physically at arms-length while utilizing
diplomatic channels, and a dynamic approach that draws from both ends of the spectrum.
Without the data collected by the EX-D support, we would not know in this detail these
tendencies of state support.

As Collier et al (2012) put it “The challenge for both qualitative and quantitative measurement is to find
the scope of comparison and level of aggregation – that is, the degree to which indicators are broken down
into their constituent elements – best suited to the analytic goals of the study.”
62
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Certain themes have emerged over the course of the analysis that comprise this
dissertation’s main findings. First, according to my data there are three ideal types of
state supporters: willing revisionists, grievance legitimizers, and institutional stewards.
The primary conditions that place a particular state in a particular ideal type are the sort
of support offered, the supporter’s orientation toward global human rights, and the quality
of its relationship with the sitting government.
This project did not benefit from data that could directly analyze the degree to
which the relationship between the movement and supporter matter, but we got some
hints. Specifically, states prove to be primarily self-interested actors that rarely take
active interest in the concrete goals of movements. There is a rather small region on the
plot that would be consistent with deep altruistic commitment to the movement and its
goals, which comprises a subregion in the zone of institutional stewardship. Here state
supporters could be characterized by their allegiance to global human rights and dynamic
supportive profile. In that zone, states would not demonstrate particularly strong
opposition to the targeted regime, thus have a mitigated risk of vested political interests.
Outside this zone of altruism, though, support appears to be a way for states to achieve
other things that have relatively little to do with the movement achieving its goals.
Dynamics in the MDS plot of the global sample presented another interesting
pattern: as antagonism grows between a supporting and target state, supporters will tend
toward public advocacy rather than active measures. Hostile enabling of a movement is
quite rare, according to the data. One reason for this could be that intervening materially
in a rival’s protest could allow the targeted regime space to deflect from its own failings.
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Meernik (2001) puts forward this line of reasoning – vulnerable states that are also bad at
governance might draw attention to foreign material intervention as a convenient way to
distract from domestic woes.

Implications for Scholars
We now have a better idea of what supporting states do, and what distinguishes
one from another. We can eschew overly simplistic notions that state supporters are
inherently antagonistic to targeted governments, and we have reason to explore support to
nonviolent movements on its own rather than only in reference to violent rebellion.
This dissertation surfaces several questions that merit further investigation. Even
if we can categorize state supporters according to notions of their commitment to a
movement, we can only guess what drives them to be a supporter in the first place. The
above has provided some starting clues: states weaker than the target appear to rarely
intervene, for example. Beyond that, more work is needed to explain the onset of state
support.63
Second, any future exploration of this topic will need a better measure for
economic ties between the supporting and target state. In the South Africa case study,
trade ties did seem to have a meaningful relationship to the dimensions clustering state
supporters. The importance of trade, however, mostly disappeared in the global sample.
This mirrors reality in an important way – economic integration today is much more than
63

As the work by Clifford Bob (2005) highlights, activists can never be certain who or what organizations
will latch onto their cause. Nor can they be sure which supporters are likely to “stay in” (Jentleson and
Levite 1992) once they have shown up. These issues remain to be addressed, and hopefully this project
provides a starting point.
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exports and imports between states. A better economic variable would account for
infrastructure dependence like Zambia’s on South Africa. It would account for the
strategic nature of things traded (i.e. minerals), which cannot be noted purely through
trade volume. It might account for future trade expectations (Copeland 2014). And, it
would account for FDI and the presence or absence of companies, both private and those
linked to a potential supporting state.
Third, future investigation should consider the degree to which states delegate
support to movements through multilateral organizations. This dissertation focused on the
“triad” – interactions between the supporting state, the movement/civil society, and the
targeted regime (San-Akca 2016). However, mass sums of money and effort are
expended through IGOs like the European Community, and the UN (Burnell 2008). We
do not know what causes states to choose direct or facilitated support, and how that
choice affects recipients.
In a general sense, though, this dissertation shows the importance of allowing
multiple frameworks to coexist when investigating a complicated international
phenomenon. In looking at a single behavior, I have shown that states approach
movements in ways that align with commonly offered schools of thought in international
politics (Wheeler 1992). Willing revisionists may adhere more to a realist, Hobbesian
approach. Institutional stewards, seeking to shore up states, align with an international
society view, and the grievance legitimators could be argued to subscribe to universal
international values at least superficially, albeit for instrumental reasons. Seeing various

122

frameworks integrated to explain a single phenomenon would not have been possible if I
had invested upfront in a single theoretical approach.

Implications for Policymakers
Policymakers might take away two main points. First, they find here a counternarrative to the ubiquitous accusation that foreign governments are responsible for
maximalist nonviolent movements. Certainly, the more menacing forms of foreign
meddling in political institutions is a topic of growing salience. However, such activity
(i.e., election interference, social media disinformation campaigns) comprise a small
piece of a broader picture. Based on this data, the most unfriendly governments appear to
keep their distance from events on the ground. More data will be needed to further
interrogate this claim. In addition, the governments taking active postures are mostly
those that have already been engaged with the targeted government through official
development assistance channels, which quite possibly also includes support to its
security apparatus.64
Second, this dissertation highlights that nondemocracies provide support to prodemocracy movements more often than we might think. This diversity in support offers
some indication of the strength of the global human rights regime. Even if repression
happens within the borders of China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, these countries are
still engaging in conventional diplomatic practice and speaking out against repression
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Highlighted in activist commentary at an ICNC event in 2021.
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elsewhere. We might consider how to amplify such pro-democratic behavior on the part
of nondemocracies.

Implications for Activists/Practitioners
For practitioners, this dissertation offers a language and a framework to better
understand the spectrum of state support they might expect. It provides a way to translate
a foreign policy-driven government’s behavior into a framework of commitment to their
goals. Beyond that, though, this research gives activists reason (if they did not already
have it) to question government supporters’ interest in the success of their movement,
specifically. The spectrum of possible support, after all, includes behaviors that are not
only pro-movement, but also pro-stability, and anti-regime.
According to Weber, identifying the ideal points provides only partial insight into
the phenomenon of interest. Now what remains is to explore the degree to which
empirical cases differ from the ideal types, in what ways, and why that might be the case
(Swedberg 2018). As Swedberg puts it, the ideal type must now confront reality.
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Methodological Appendix: Maps versus Matrices

This dissertation offers an approach to systematic categorization that differs from
the conventional approach of typology creation. Finding typological research overly
restrictive, I turn instead to creating data-extracted ideal types using a collection of
quantitative techniques. The difference is substantive – whereas typology “takes a highdimensional object and returns one and only one value from a finite set” (Ahlquist and
Breunig 2012), ideal types are heuristic devices to set our bearings in relation to a topic
of interest (Swedberg 2018).
Typically, we define typologies as exhaustive and mutually exclusive systems for
categories of things of interest (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012). Typologies in
political science tend to be qualitative endeavors and there are multiple types. Usually
typologies take one of two forms: descriptive or explanatory. Descriptive (or conceptual)
typologies help to “explicate the meaning of a concept,” or make explicit its attributes.
Explanatory typologies, meanwhile, categorize outcomes by what brought them about. In
the qualitative tradition of typology, scholars tend to choose a certain typology “type”
and must carefully scope their cases and variables so that dimensions do not grow to
become unwieldy (Elman 2005).65 Collier et al. (2012) provide an extensive list of
typologies in social science. They also convey a fascinating discomfort with typologies

Elman (2005) offers helpful techniques to “compress” the property space, and even to “expand” it as
necessary.
65
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that do not fit neatly within a matrix – another restriction imposed by typological
epistemology that this project sets aside.
The popularization of certain statistical techniques has made quantitative
typologies possible. In 1980, Carmines and Stimson compared results from multiple
probit models to categorize people into one of four groups according to issue-voter type
(Carmines and Stimson 1980). Several studies in political science utilize latent class
analysis, which is showing signs of becoming more popular.66 As an example, Blaydes
and Linzer (2008) use latent class analysis to identify different qualities of Islamic belief
systems in women. They find four sub-groups (secular-liberal, religious, traditional, and
fundamentalist) and argue that unemployed, married women with low levels of education
and social class are most likely to subscribe to a fundamentalist belief system. Latent
class analysis, thus, offers the opportunity to transcend the usual separation between
descriptive and explanatory typologies.
Data-driven ideal types are less common, although appetite is growing to develop
approaches that can achieve them (Ahlquist and Breunig 2012; Swedberg 2018).Three
notable pieces of scholarship have extracted empirical ideal types: Gosta EspingAnderson’s three worlds of welfare capitalism, Robert Dahl’s conception of democracy
as an ideal type, and most recently, Stacie Goddard’s (2018) piece using network analysis
to explore ideal types of international order revisionists. The notable difference between
work that extracts ideal types versus the work that seeks a typology is that scholars of
66

Despite being an explicit way of deriving typology, LCA escapes mention in Collier, LaPorte and
Seawright’s (2012) piece on typology, who opt instead to discuss IRT and structural equation models,
which have made significant inroads into political science relative to LCA (Fariss 2014; Armstrong 2011;
Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).
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ideal types usually embrace the Weberian stipulation that no observation fully
encompasses the type with which it is associated. Esping-Anderson writes “we show that
welfare states cluster, but we must recognize that there is no single pure case. The
Scandinavian countries may be predominantly social democratic, but they are not free of
crucial liberal elements. Neither are the liberal regimes pure types” (28). Dahl writes of
democracy:
In this book I should like to reserve the term “democracy” for a political system one of the
characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all
its citizens. Whether such a system actually exists, has existed, or can exist need not concern us for
the moment…As a hypothetical system, one end of a scale, or a limiting state of affairs, it can
(like a perfect vacuum) serve as a basis for estimating the degree to which various systems
approach this theoretical limit.” (2)

The advantage of an ideal typical approach over a typological one lies in the
appreciation of the distance from an empirical observation to the theorized ideal type.
The difference between the observation and the ideal type is interesting, and an avenue
for discovery, rather than a potential violation of categorical assignment. The inductive
nature of this dissertation justifies an ideal typical approach rather than typology. It
allows a descriptive and exploratory way to uncover the structure of data and manage
many different variables suggested as important by the literature and the South Africa
case study. This amounts to categorization as theory building (Ahlquist and Breunig
2012). Using methods of latent variable estimation, multidimensional scaling, and kmeans clustering I produce ideal typical maps that up to this point have been referred to
only metaphorically (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013). In this appendix I provide more
detailed descriptions of the analytic approach and provide additional output.
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Bayesian Item Response Theory
As described in Chapter 4, I created a new variable that measures state
involvement using item-response theory (IRT) in the Bayesian framework. I use IRT in
this context to create a summary variable of five indicators of state support available from
the raw EX-D dataset. Most commonly, IRT is used in education to assess individuals’
levels of various kinds of academic ability, but it also has extensive applicability in
political science. Past studies have used it to measure estimates of political information
(Jackman 2000), to manage cross-national expert surveys (Pemstein et al. 2015), and to
create measures of respect for human rights (Fariss 2014). This dissertation uses IRT in
an almost mechanical fashion to learn about item quality, tendencies of states supporters,
and to learn inductively the sort of continuum along which we can characterize state
support. In this section I outline the process and code used to generate involvement
scores and interpret the continuum of assistance provided to protests.
EX-D (introduced in Chapter 1) is an event dataset that reports raw instances of
support from a provider to a recipient. After filtering the dataset to include only stateprovided support, I collapsed it first into counts of each pre-defined support type (i.e.,
bolster, pressure, stabilize, enable, and equip) at the state-protest dyad unit of analysis.
Then, I dichotomized these counts into simple 1s or 0s. Using dichotomous indicators
was necessary because of the wide variation in counts. For example, western supporters
that report ODA projects through AidData.org demonstrated very high numbers of
enabling support because even the smallest disbursement of funds would be considered
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an instance of support. Non-OECD countries, by contrast, showed much lower counts of
enabling support (if any), predictably, since they do not provide ODA at the same levels
or they do not report it publicly. Since the dataset includes financial assistance to
movements detected in media reports it is feasibly that non-OECD countries “enabled”
movements.
With the key indicators arranged in a matrix of zeros and ones, they can be fed
into the IRT model. I use the classical 2-parameter IRT model with a logit link function,
per Jackman (2000):
𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≡ Pr[𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1] = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝛽𝑗1 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗2 )

The model generates estimates that a given state supporter i would provide support type j
based on three values, all of which are unknown prior to estimation: a state’s latent level
of involvement Inv, the item (support type) discrimination 𝛽𝑗1 and the item (support type)
difficulties 𝛽𝑗2 , where j = 1,..,5 for the five indicators of support. I estimate the model
using the R Statistical Software, R2jags package.
In the Bayesian framework, estimating the model above becomes a “missing data
problem” as explained in Jackman (2000), where each parameter is akin to a missing
value that can be found through simulation techniques. The Gibbs sampler used by the
program draws an arbitrary number of samples (7,000 in this case) from conditional
distributions for each parameter, updating the distribution with each iteration based on
information in the observed data. The model converges on a joint posterior distribution
for the estimated parameters inv, 𝛽𝑗1 , and 𝛽𝑗2 . This is computationally simpler than
maximum likelihood estimations, particularly in the presence of hundreds of parameters.
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This model requires the estimation of 789 parameters (779 observations + five
discrimination parameters + five difficulty parameters). Upon model convergence the
marginal distributions for each parameter can be summarized with an appropriate statistic
(mean or median) that serves as an estimate for further analysis.
To ensure parameter identification and aid convergence I treated the “enable”
item as a reference parameter (Jackman 2001) and constrained it to the negative end of
the variable continuum. Recall that enabling support indicated whether a state sends
financial resources to a targeted state in support of civil society and democratization
through official development assistance channels. With this constraint, the simple 2parameter IRT model showed evidence of convergence where all monitored parameters
corresponded to an rhat < 1.1, and effective iterations well over 100.
In the IRT model, I assume the newly created involvement variable is distributed
normally with mean mu and a precision of one. As mentioned, the 2PL model provides
posterior distributions for the item discrimination and difficulty. I specify diffuse normal
priors for the discrimination and difficulty parameters, with mean zero and variance 10.
The model featured significant discrimination parameters for all five support type
indicators, indicating that “involvement” can reasonably be depicted on a unidimensional
continuum with the indicators created (Jackman 2001). The items show weakness in
terms of difficulty parameters, though. Posterior distributions for several item difficulty
parameters included zero, specifically those for bolster, enable, and pressure. This can be
interpreted to mean that a state’s position along the latent continuum ambiguously affects
its likelihood of provided those types of support.
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Table 2 Item Parameters (* indicates that the 95% posterior distribution included zero)

Indicator
Bolster
Equip
Enable
Pressure
Stabilize

Discrimination
(Posterior Mean)
1.757
-.383
-3.242
1.503
.788

Difficulty
(Posterior Mean)
.657*
1.295
.707*
.577*
2.052

Sample
Frequency
.187
.281
.712
.204
.074

The dataset analyzed for the global sample is both nested (many states support the
same protest), and cross-classified (the same state might support multiple movements).
We attempted to account for the hierarchical and cross classified structure of the data
with multilevel IRT models but were not able to achieve convergence despite runs of
several hundred thousand iterations. When relatively straightforward models do not reach
convergence with such a high number of iterations, the conventional wisdom says to
simplify the model (Gelman and Hill 2006, 369). The inability to use protest movement
random effects, state random effects, or both (none converged) reflects the extremely
unbalanced nature of my sample. Certain protests in the global sample saw very few
foreign supporters, while others saw a diverse range. Similarly, certain states supported
many movements, whereas most supported one. Table 3 below shows lists the protest
movements that received the highest and lowest supporters, and their rank in the full
sample. Table 4 lists the most prolific supporters alongside examples of the many states
that supported a single movement.
Data quality aside, the inability to assign random effects for state supporter or
protest movement aligns with ideas presented earlier in this dissertation. From the USVenezuela case, we have reason to suspect that intrinsic movement characteristics do not

145

matter very much in shaping state support. Second, as shown in plots that demonstrated
some states (i.e. the United States) vary more in their behavior than others (i.e. Sweden)
state effects are unlikely to be a systematic feature of support to protest movements. With
the continuum of involvement specified as a single continuous variable, it can now be
integrated with other continuous variables in a multidimensional scaling solution.
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Table 3 Most and Least Supported Movements in EX-D

Rank

Country

Year

Movement Name

1
2

Syria
Egypt

2011
2007

Syrian Uprising
January 25 Revolution (Anti-Mubarak)

36
27

3

Georgia

2007

Anti-Shashkvilli campaign

25

4

Belarus

2006

Denim Revolution (Belarus ProDemocracy Campaign)

22

5

Senegal

2000

Anti-Diouf

20

6

Egypt

2003

Kifaya

20

7

Egypt

2013

Pro-Morsi Protests

19

8

Yugoslavia

2000

Bulldozer Revolution (Anti-Milosevic)

19

9

Haiti

2005

Pro-Aristide Campaign

18

10

Iran

2009

Green Revolution and Day of Rage

18

11

Kyrgyzstan

2005

Tulip Revolution

18

12

Egypt

2013

Anti-Morsi Protests

18

54

Mexico

2006

Anti-Calderon Movement

5

55

Maldives

2012

Nasheed Supporters

5

56

Bahrain

2011

Bahrain Anti-King Hamad

5

57

Russia

2010

Snow Revolution

4

58

Djibouti

2011

Djibouti Arab Spring

4

59

Turkey

2013

anti-Erdogan

4

60

Jordan

2011

Protest for Constitutional Reform

3

61

Indonesia

2000

West Papua Anti-Occupation

3

62

Tonga

2005

Tongan Pro-Democracy Protests

2

63

Bulgaria

2013

Dance With Me

2

64

Fiji

2000

Anti-Chaudhry Campaign

2

65

Thailand

2013

Civil Movement for Democracy

1
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# State Supporters

Table 4 Most and Least Prolific State Supporters

Rank

State Supporter

# Movements Supported

1

United States of America

61

2

Germany

51

3

Canada

49

4

United Kingdom

42

5

France

41

6

Sweden

39

7

Norway

38

8

Switzerland

33

9

Belgium

30

10

Netherlands

30

86

Ukraine

1

87

South Sudan

1

88

Mexico

1

89

Iceland

1

90

Gambia

1

91

Latvia

1

92

Cambodia

1

93

Slovenia

1

94

Niger

1

95

Dominican Republic

1
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Table 5 Two-parameter IRT Model with 1 Constraint
irt <-function(){
for(i in 1:779){
for(j in 1:5){
items[i,j] ~ dbern(p[i,j])
logit(p[i,j]) <- Inv[i]*g[j,1] - g[j,2]
}
}
for(i in 1:779){
Inv[i] ~ dnorm(mu.Inv[i],1)
mu.Inv[i] <- mu
}
mu ~dnorm(0,.1)
g[1,1]
g[2,1]
g[3,1]
g[4,1]
g[5,1]

~
~
~
~
~

dnorm(0,1)
dnorm(0,1)
dnorm(0,1);T(,0)
dnorm(0,1)
dnorm(0,1)

for(j in 1:5){
g[j,2]

~dnorm(0,1)

}
}
lca.dat<-list("items"=items)
lca.params<-c("g", "Inv", "mu")
irtfit<-jags(data=lca.dat, inits= NULL, lca.params, n.chains=2,
n.iter=7000, n.burnin=4000, n.thin = 1, model.file=irt)
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Multidimensional Scaling and Dimensional Analysis
MDS is a form of structural analysis that plots observations according to how
similar they are to each other in a low-dimensional space. To run this analysis, I created a
row profile for each state-protest dyad that includes the supporter’s involvement score on
the IRT variable, and its values on the key variables described in Chapter 4: the presence
of domestic civilian support, relative bilateral capabilities, the level of supporter’s human
rights embeddedness, bilateral foreign policy distance, and trade dependence.
In MDS, the first step is to transform the raw data into a n x n matrix of
dissimilarities using the dist() function in R. The following Euclidean formula is used
to find the dissimilarities between each observation based on their values on each
variable. It finds the differences on each variable and sums them for each pair, generating
a square matrix of dissimilarities (Mair, Groenen, and de Leeuw n.d.).

𝟓

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 = √∑(𝑥𝒊 − 𝑥𝒋 )

2

𝒑=𝟏

The scaling conducted in this project is nonmetric. This means the solution plots scaled
dissimilarities on an ordinal rather than a ratio scale. Using the R smacof package, I
specify the option for ordinal MDS, which transforms the dissimilarities matrix with a
monotone step function. The result of the transformation is a disparity matrix 𝑑̂𝑖𝑗 , which
is passed to the MDS function.
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To find the optimal solution smacof uses majorization67 to find coordinates for
each observation in two dimensions that reflect as much of the information in 𝑑̂𝑖𝑗 as
possible. To do this it minimizes stress (𝜎 2 ). Stress is a measure of how much the
visualized distances in the reduced two-dimensional space differ from the those in the
disparity matrix 𝑑̂𝑖𝑗 . The matrix X contains the coordinates (called configurations) for
each observation where:

𝟐

𝑑𝑖𝑗 (𝐗) = √∑(𝑥𝑖𝑠 − 𝑥𝑗𝑠 )

2

𝒔=𝟏

The function to be minimized to locate optimal coordinates in low-dimensional space is:
̂ , 𝐗) =
𝜎 (𝐃
2

2
∑𝒊<𝒋 𝑤𝑖𝑗 (𝑑̂𝑖𝑗 − 𝑑𝑖𝑗 (𝐗))

𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2

Two-dimensional solutions are optimal from an interpretation standpoint, but nothing
guarantees that two-dimensions appropriately fit the data. For that reason, using a loop I
check the stress of one to five dimensions. After that I calculate the MDS solution. Stress
for one dimension is .28, for two is .108, and for three is .04. Given the gains of a twodimensional solution for interpretation, and an acceptable stress of 11%, I ultimately
chose the 2-dimensional solution.

67

Majorization is a way to optimize a function. According to de Leeuw and Mair (2009), majorization
means to find a more simple surrogate function to optimize that majorizes the function of interest. A
surrogate function 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦) majorizes a function of interest 𝑓(𝑥) if for all x 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑓(𝑥).
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Table 6 Multidimensional Scaling Code
#Calculate distance matrix using identified variables
dist.matrix <- dist(MDS.variables)

#Confirm dimensionality
ndim <- 5
result <- vector("list", ndim)
for (i in 1:ndim){
result[[i]] <- smacofSym(dist.matrix, ndim=i, type="ordinal",
ties="primary")
}
stress <- sapply(result, function(x)x$stress)
stress

# Compute MDS Solution
global.mds <- smacofSym(dist.global, ndim = 2, type = "ordinal", ties
= "primary")

#Visualize locations of observations with high and low values of key
variables
HR <- ggplot(mds, aes(x=D1, y=D2, color = HREmbeddedness)) +
geom_point(aes(colour = cut(HRembed,2)),
size = 2,
position=position_jitter(width=.01, height = .01))

K-means Clustering
Cluster analysis seeks to identify groups of observations that are most similar
internally while being as different as possible to the other groups. K-means clustering is
known as a relocation clustering method where the analyst first specifies the number of
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clusters to create and the algorithm optimally locates observations in each cluster
(Ahlquist and Breunig 2012). Optimal placement is defined by a minimized distance to
the “centroids,” the middle location of a multidimensional space. Optimal distance refers
to a minimized the within-cluster sum of squares. The cluster centroid is the mean value
on each dimension of all points assigned to that cluster. In this analysis the centroids are
the notional ideal types. Weaknesses of k-means, as described by Ahlquist and Breunig,
include a risk of overinterpretation (seeing patterns that don’t actually exist), and the
artificial creation of spherical clusters as an artifact of the use of Euclidian distances.
K-means is executed in a series of steps that is repeated for each observation in
the sample. It begins by selecting three candidate observations as initial cluster centers,
and iterates through each observation finding which cluster it should belong to according
to its distance from each cluster centroid (Hartigan and Wong 1979). After assignment, a
new calculation is made to update the corresponding centroid. I use the kmeans()
function from the R stats package to locate clusters. This function defaults to
calculating distances according to Euclidean distances, which I retain. The variables used
in the clustering are the coordinates provided by the MDS function described above.
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Figure 16 Cluster Selection Plot

Because the analyst must set the number of clusters, I show how I visually
determined the optimal number of clusters. Table 7 shows the information gains for each
cluster configuration from 1 to 20, which is analogous to an R2 score in regression.
According to the plot below, the greatest gains in information occur up to three or four
clusters. There is no obvious elbow in this plot confirming that states are not clustering in
obvious ways. The three-cluster solution, however, provided well-differentiated centroids
on key variables, which was why it was ultimately selected.
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Table 7 Cluster Selection Code

#Identify number of clusters to use in solution
Table 8 Cluster Selection Code
N=20

information=rep(NA,N)
for(i in 1:N){
KM=kmeans(as.matrix(global.coords), centers = i, iter.max
= 35,nstart = 10)
information[i]=KM$betweenss/KM$totss
}
plot(information~seq(1:N), type="b",pch=16, col=4,
ylab="Information Retained",lwd=2,
xlab="Number of Clusters", main="Elbow Plot")
#Assign cluster membership and join with MDS coordinates
clust <- kmeans(as.matrix(global.coords), centers=3)
Groups <- as.factor(clust$cluster)
mds <- cbind(global.coords, Groups, MDS.final)

#Create plot
clusterplot <- ggscatter(mds, x = "D1", y = "D2",
color = "Groups",
palette = "jco",
size = 1,
ellipse = TRUE,
ellipse.type = "convex",
repel = TRUE)

clusterplot <- print(clusterplot +

labs(x= "", y=""))

Table 7 Cluster Selection Code#Identify number of clusters to use in
solution
N=20
information=rep(NA,N)
for(i in 1:N){
KM=kmeans(as.matrix(global.coords),
centers = i, iter.max
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= 35,nstart = 10)
information[i]=KM$betweenss/KM$totss
}
plot(information~seq(1:N), type="b",pch=16, col=4,

